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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION AND CEO TURNOVER 
AMONG FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED FIRMS 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Jana L. Cook 
 
 
 
 
 
A comprehensive examination of the differences in compensation and turnover between 
domestic and multinational firms in distress from 2003 – 2008 was completed.  An 
examination of three major theories of turnover is examined within the boundaries of 
distressed firms and support is found for the Scapegoat Theory as proposed by Huson in 
2004.  The results found no significant differences between total compensation levels 
between domestic and international firms.  And with turnover rates of 26 percent and 51 
percent, these groups have only board size as a significant impacting variable. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background of the Problem 
Risk reduction has been identified as a motive for product and/or geographic 
diversification of firms for many years. Mergers between two firms have been shown to 
reduce risk in new firms (Amihud & Lev, 1981).  Managers often have large 
undiversified stakes in their own firms and the reduction of corporate risk can insure 
increased private returns.  This merger, however, is not necessarily beneficial to the 
shareholders in a perfect capital market. May (1995) found that managers with more 
wealth in the firm equity will engage in acquisitions with greater diversifying benefits of 
risk reduction. Shareholders, on the other hand, hold well-diversified portfolios and do 
not always want the risk diversification at the corporate level.  
When managers behave in a way that is not beneficial to the shareholders, an 
agency conflict exists (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory also introduces the idea 
that managers might diversify in an attempt to create an entrenched position or solidify 
their indispensable skills (Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003). Aggarwal and Samwick 
identified two main reasons for diversification: (1) to reduce risk, and (2) to capture 
private benefits. They found that the private benefit is seen as the stronger of the motives.  
The benefits identified as making the CEOs more valuable were: the gaining of prestige 
in managing a large diversified firm, higher pay, and easier to skim from larger firms 
because of entrenchment. 
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Many researchers have attempted to link CEO turnover to diversification as one 
of the private benefits of diversifying.  Does diversification cause entrenchment thus 
leading to a lower chance of CEO turnover?  In a recent study, Tsai et al. (2009) asked 
several key questions that relate to this topic:  (1) Do large firms exhibit significantly 
higher levels of turnover? (2) Is CEO turnover in large diversified firms lower than small, 
diversified firms? And (3) is turnover in large firms more likely to be less sensitive to 
poor performance when adopting diversification strategies than turnovers in small firms? 
The scope of their study is limited to the family owned businesses in Taiwan:  Their 
results showed that if a company was well diversified, there would be a lower chance the 
CEO would be replaced.  Berry et al (2006) found the more complex the firm, in terms of 
product lines, the less the chance of turnover in top management. Iqbal and French (2007) 
found managers who owned larger stakes in the firm’s stock were less likely to be 
replaced due to their impact on corporate control. 
Rose and Shepard (1997) examined firms between 1985 and 1990 and found that 
CEOs of diversified firms were paid 13% more in salaries and bonuses than similar sized 
non-diversified firms. They stated “our findings support an interpretation of 
diversification premia as rents earned by high-ability CEOs.”   
While CEOs do receive higher pay for diversification thus making them more 
difficult to replace, it is not the only reason for diversifying.  Furthermore, Duru and 
Reeb (2002) found that the compensation premium for CEOs was seen mainly in 
geographic diversification and not industrial diversification. CEO compensation and 
ability then would make the entrenchment motive more conclusive, since the greater the 
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ability and experience in managing internationally diversified firms would make the CEO 
more difficult to replace.   
Lehn and Zhao (2006) found that forty-seven percent of CEOs of acquiring firms 
are replaced within 5 years and that the likelihood of CEO turnover is negatively related 
to bidder returns. In the earlier mentioned paper by Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon and Naveen 
(2006), they found preliminary support for the idea that CEO turnover in diversified firms 
is “completely insensitive” to firm performance.  Sanders and Carpenter (2001) argued 
that CEOs with international experience create value for their firms, thus creating value 
for themselves. This creation of value for the firm is yet another reason for the possibility 
of reduced turnover in diversified firms.  
Gilson (1989) found that at least 52% of firms in financial distress experience 
turnover in top management. This paper proposes the hypothesis that CEO turnover in 
internationally diversified firms suffering from financial distress is lower than in non-
diversified firms in financial distress. 
Gilson defined the distressed firm as one with an “inability to meet the fixed 
payment obligations on debt.”  He limited this further by saying firms are distressed if 
they defaulted on debt, filed for bankruptcy, or restructured their existing debt (1990).   In 
a later paper, Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) found that one-third of all CEOs in 
distressed firms were replaced and those that remained, experienced large salary and 
bonus reductions. Turnover was defined as a change in top management.  Specifically, 
Gilson defined top management as one holding the position of Chief Executive Officer, 
President or Chairman of the Board.  These positions are most visible and most often held 
accountable in times of financial distress.   
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This paper proposes to extend the research on agency theory by looking at one of 
the private benefits of entering international markets – the reduced incidence of CEO 
turnover in financially distressed firms. This paper proposes that international firms will 
see less top management turnover, in financial distress, than their domestic counterparts.  
This is primarily thought to be due to the value of international experience and the 
limited pool of viable managerial candidates. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Daily, the news is riddled with articles about CEOs and top managers acting in a 
way that benefits themselves, not the shareholders.  Enron, WorldCom, Bear Sterns, 
Goldman Sachs, Chesapeake Energy and AIG are just a few that have dominated the 
headlines in the last ten years.  But do all managers act in a way that is not beneficial to 
the shareholders?  Jensen (1976) and again with Murphy in 1990, have long promoted the 
principal-agent problem, or as it is often called, agency theory.  This theory states simply 
that managers can and will act in their own best interest, and that this interest may not be 
in the best interest of the owners or shareholders. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) focused 
on two major reasons why managers diversify their firms:  (1) to reduce idiosyncratic risk 
and (2) to capture private benefits.   And as Jensen and Murphy powerfully stated (1990), 
“If shareholders had complete information regarding CEO’s activities and the firm’s 
investment opportunities, they could design a contract specifying and enforcing the 
managerial action to be taken in each state of the world.    Managerial actions and 
investment opportunities are not, however, perfectly observable by shareholders”(Jensen 
& Murphy, 1990, p. 226).   This problem is quite simply stated but powerful none-the-
less.  A CEO’s actions are seldom completely visible to the owners of the firm – 
especially for international firms where monitoring is even more difficult.  
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Historically, research has focused on the behavior of management when it does 
not align with shareholders best interests. Studies have looked at a variety of behaviors 
for confirmation of agency theory principles both in domestic and international markets. 
Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) found that entering an international market reduced excess 
firm value.   
Many other researchers looked at the impact of managerial compensation on 
subsequent behavior of management. Duru and Reeb (2002) showed that diversification 
does result in a compensation premium.  In a sample of 7,085 firm years, Duru and Reeb 
gathered observations from 1991 to 1995.  Using Compustat Execucomp and Disclosure 
WorldScope data, the researchers only used firm year observations that included market 
value of the equity, the book value of equity, earnings before extraordinary items, 
earnings before interest and taxes, total assets and sales, foreign assets and sales and the 
number of industry segments.  These data requirements gave a sample size of 1,572 U.S. 
based firms for the years studied.  The regression model examined several key factors’ 
impact on CEO pay that had been determined to be influential in previous literature 
including: current firm, performance, investment opportunity, common stock return, and 
a size factor.  They concluded that the level of and structure of CEO compensation are 
functions of corporate diversification. Therefore CEOs are paid more to be more 
geographically diverse, whether it is because of the knowledge or magnitude of 
operations as the reasoning. Logic would also allow one to assume these same 
characteristics that result in higher pay would result in fewer incidences of turnover, 
primarily due to the difficulty of replacing such expertise.  
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In fact, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) have argued that CEOs will diversify to 
increase the prestige associated with the control of a multi-national corporation. 
Does this risk of executive job or compensation loss affect the decisions a manager might 
make?   This “employment risk” is difficult to “diversify away.” Several authors found 
that the reduction of this “employment risk” is a valid motive for the internationalization 
of the firm (Amihud & Lev, 1981).  This paper proposes that the diversification of a 
distressed firm into a multi-national market is negatively related with the possibility of 
CEO turnover and reduction in pay. First, an examination of the literature on the 
distressed firms should be done. 
As previously stated, distressed firms are defined as firms that cannot meet their 
debt obligations.  Gilson (1989) defined a distressed firm as one with an “inability to 
meet the fixed payment obligations on debt.”  He defined this further by saying firms are 
distressed if they defaulted on debt, filed for bankruptcy, or restructured their existing 
debt (1990). The bankruptcy could include either Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceedings under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In 1990, with a sample size of 685 firm 
years and 409 firms, Gilson looked at CEO turnover in distressed firms. Gathering data 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), the researchers cited that the 
sample of firms that experienced large common stock price declines over the 1979 
through 1984 period.  Gilson also defined management turnover as “any change in the 
group of individuals who together hold the titles of CEO, president, and chairman of the 
board.” A simple exchange of titles is not considered turnover.  They confirmed the 
changes in senior positions by mention in the Wall Street Journal or Standard and Poor’s 
Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives. The final sample was reduced to 
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587 firm years, representing 381 firms.  In his pivotal research on CEO turnover, Gilson 
identified several factors that can affect CEO turnover.  Gilson’s sample of firms was 
generally seen to be “small, highly leveraged and unprofitable.”  Almost two-thirds of 
those sampled were listed on the AMEX, which are generally smaller firms.  Size was 
determined by book value of the firm’s assets.  Gilson’s research showed a -161.0% to -
164.8% return for the sample.  The returns were economically and statistically 
significant.  Gilson reported that managerial turnover is seen more often in financially 
distressed firms.  By examining the firms throughout the turnover process, Gilson 
measured turnover due to financial distress by tracking the fraction of managers who 
retained a senior management position in their firms throughout the bankruptcy or debt 
restructuring.  For the combined sample of 126 firms facing bankruptcy or restructuring, 
only 34% of the original managers remain at the end of the four-year period.  He also 
found that more managers keep their positions when the debt is restructured privately. 
Gilson discussed some of the side effects of the loss of jobs due to financial distress.  He 
listed the loss of income, firm-specific human capital, and power and prestige as some of 
the losses incurred.  Managerial losses are considered greater when the change is forced.  
In his sample, Gilson found a relative frequency of forced changes to be 0.83 for 
financially distressed firms and 0.66 for non-financially distressed firms.  His results 
were significant with a p-value of 0.01.  Gilson’s final results yielded a 52% turnover rate 
in firms experiencing financial distress. This paper led many other researchers to examine 
turnover.  
 Many researchers also examined the behavior of the firm before the dismissal of 
the CEO. Distressed firms were found to exhibit common behavior patterns.  Jostarndt 
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and Sautner (2008) found a decrease in ownership concentration among 267 distressed 
German firms.  They found that private owners give up their dominating role which 
results in a less effective managerial monitoring system. Monitoring then becomes the 
job of creditors and other less dominant investors. This study was limited in its scope due 
to its examination of only German firms. However, Huson et al. (2001) found that in spite 
of increased or changed internal monitoring, the likelihood of turnover remained fairly 
constant.  This paper was a response to the theory that increased monitoring would 
reduce irresponsibility and eventually turnover. In a study covering CEO turnover from 
1971 to 1994, they examined the nature of CEO turnover.  During the time period 
studied, Huson et al found that “outsider representation on corporate boards, the level of 
incentive compensation paid to outside directors, and external pressure on directors by 
institutional directors all increased, whereas the average board size decreased.” The 
researchers examined CEOs who had recently accepted the position. They also examined 
turnovers, excluding those that were the result of a takeover. Their sample size of 1,316 
CEOs was large and covered many firm types and industries to allow for a broad sample. 
They also calculated the firms’ accounting and stock returns for each year the CEO was 
in office. They also gathered information on the CEO’s age, tenure in office and tenure in 
the firm. Finally, they determined the reason for CEO turnover from the Wall Street 
Journal. The firms were considered to have increased monitoring, or control activity, if 
evidence was found of a “proxy fight, a takeover rumor, the adopting of an antitakeover 
measure, a board shakeup, a change in ownership requiring the filing of a Schedule 13D 
form with the Securities and Exchange commission or any similar activity.” They saw an 
increase in the hiring of outsiders from 11.3 percent in the 1971 to 1976 period to 21.2 
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percent in the 1990’s. They also found an increase in CEO turnover when stock returns 
had been negative.  They ultimately found significant relationships between the 
likelihood of forced CEO turnover, outside succession, the board composition and 
director stock ownership percentage. Huson et al found that the increased monitoring did 
not change the incidence of CEO turnover, so the results do not show an increase in the 
rate of forced CEO turnovers even though the mechanisms have changed.  Huson, 
Malatesta and Parrino (2004) in a later study confirmed that accounting measures 
declined before a CEO turnover and improved after a turnover. So increasing research 
has been conducted to confirm the relationship between a decline in performance of a 
corporation and the turnover of its Chief Executive Officer. Weisbach (1995) found a 
higher correlation between turnover and performance when more outside board members 
made up the board of directors. This seemed to work as a check mechanism for CEOs 
and their behavior, often curbing rash decisions before they happened and also by quickly 
replacing non-performing CEOs when success factors were not met.  The outside board 
members promoted efficiency in the corporation.   
Stock price decline is another common characteristic of firms in distress (Gilson, 
1989,1993).  Gilson’s 1993 sample consisted of firms with three year unadjusted 
cumulative stock returns that were in the bottom five percent of firms listed on the New 
York (NYSE) and American (AMEX) stock exchanges. With a sample size of 77 
publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1981 to 1987, Gilson et al found 
that almost one-third of all CEOs were replaced and those that kept their jobs experienced 
large pay cuts. The loss of pay, incentives, prestige and future opportunities gave the 
management a strong incentive to avoid bankruptcy and distress at any cost. This 
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significant reduction in utility and wealth created a huge incentive to take actions that 
reduce the chance of bankruptcy and/or restructuring.  This desire to prevent termination 
leads to behaviors that will not necessarily be in the best interest of the firm.   
Researchers have also found that CEOs make risk-reducing choices which reduce 
the firm’s value to shareholders and even reduce their own potential gains.  One study 
found that even a 10% increase in termination risk would result in a decline of stock price 
from 5%-23% for firms in their sample.  They also found that changes in the 
compensation structure did not offset this termination risk behavior (Chakraborty et al, 
2010).  The increased risk of takeover also increases incentives for managerial behavior 
changes (Denis & Serrano, 1996).  Iqbal and French (2007) found that managers that are 
more strongly entrenched in the firm were less likely to be replaced in firms that were in 
financial distress. This mitigation of the replacement of the CEO has been called the 
manager-entrenchment hypothesis. Iqbal and French defined distress as four or more 
quarters of negative earnings within an eight period following twelve consecutive 
profitable quarters. With a sample size of 114 resigning executives and 279 non-resigning 
or continuing executives, the studied sample was diverse in size and industry 
classification. One interesting note in the data found that most of the firms with resigning 
CEOs were larger than the non-resigning firms. Using logistic regression, the researchers 
found that the ownership level and accumulation of additional shares could be an 
influential factor in the removal of the CEO. 
This hypothesis could be why Loderer and Sheehan (1989) found that managers 
of bankrupt firms do not necessarily bail out of their stock positions during the period 
preceding bankruptcy even though their study showed a 90% decline in stock value 
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during this time.  This could be because of trading blackout dates but even so, illustrates 
that managers’ wealth will decline drastically preceding and during bankruptcy.  So, if 
managers of bankrupt or financially distressed firms face wealth declines, loss of future 
job opportunities and loss of pride and privileges associated with running of a 
corporation, do they make other value lowering decisions that would protect their own 
interests at the expense of shareholder value? 
 Most of the research on turnover focused on the circumstances surrounding the 
firm.  Gilson showed that distressed firms were more likely to dismiss their top 
management, but other research looked at the behavior prior to distress. Weisbach found 
poor investment decisions were made prior to turnover (1995).  Turnover is often seen in 
firms that have been acquired in a merger (Krug, 2003).  Not only has the behavior been 
examined prior to turnover, but also after the turnover. 
In 2002, Dahya et al, found that when the positions of CEO and Chairman of the 
Board were not held by the same individual, an even higher incidence of turnover in 
distressed firms occurred. This practice became so popular that many countries in Europe 
made it a legal requirement once again illustrating that these positions act as a check 
mechanism on behavior of the top managerial team.  Huson et al, also found that the 
board composition, including an outsider-dominated board, increased the likelihood of 
turnover and also helped improve performance after CEO dismissal (2004).   
Much research then occurred, focusing on the circumstances, and on the 
characteristics of the CEO that fostered removal.  Age, tenure and skill were all 
examined, along with behavior prior to dismissal, but more recently the motives of 
agency came into focus.  Most executives’ pay includes both salary and stock/options.  
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This promotion of an investment in the firm was intended to curb behavior that was not in 
the best interest of the shareholder.  But, as previously discussed, recent research found 
that the wealth factor could cause entrenchment (Iqbal & French, 2007). When managers 
had a large enough stake in the firm, entrenchment took place.  Managers actually 
reduced the possibility of their own dismissal.  The researchers came to the conclusion 
that managers could use large stakes in a firm to influence the control mechanism of the 
firm and mitigate the likelihood of removal.  Many researchers went on to look at not 
only the characteristics of the CEO, but also the characteristics of the position itself.  In 
fact, little research has focused on the complexity of the internationally diversified firm 
and its affect on the choice of CEO and the eventual turnover of the CEO. 
Tsai et al (2009), found that in family firms, the more complex the structure, the 
less likelihood of turnover. In a study that examined family owned firms in Taiwan, Tsai 
et al linked product diversification with less likelihood of top management turnover.  In a 
study of 424 family owned firms, the researchers divided the family owned firms by their 
CSIC, or Chinese Standard Industry Classification codes. They then determine a 
specialization ratio to determine their level of diversification with .95 being completely 
focused and .70 being diversified. They had a 34.8 percent of firms that were diversified. 
The market for possible CEOs is not unlimited, and the more complex the job, the 
smaller the pool of acceptable candidates.  This study had two significant weaknesses for 
overall applicability.  It was based solely on firms in Taiwan and on family firms. But 
since the purpose of this paper was to focus on family firms and the mechanisms of 
control with the firm, it met its research goals. 
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Rose and Shepard investigated the relationship between CEO compensation and 
firm diversification in 1997 and found a significant difference. They explored two 
possible explanations for this:  (1) the more difficult the job, the greater the ability to 
manage the firm and thus the need for higher pay, and (2) the entrenchment caused by the 
diversification led to higher pay. They examined salaries and bonuses plus a measure for 
total compensation which would encompass stock options and perks.  CEOs of 
undiversified firms earned slightly lower average salaries and total compensation than the 
CEOs of diversified firms.  Rose and Shepard measured diversification in a very 
straightforward manner.  They measured the number of unique four-digit SIC code 
segments reported for each year.  Then using a more complex measure, they created a 
diversity measuring 1 minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  They then went on to 
measure the firm size to account for the well-researched relationship between size and 
compensation.  Then they continued to study the impact of firm performance, age, tenure 
and background of the CEO knowing these variables can also impact CEO pay.  Their 
final results supported the explanation that pay premiums were given to CEOs of 
diversified firms because of the increased complexity and ability needed to guide a multi-
segment firm. In other words, higher ability equals higher pay. 
Berry et al, also found a relationship between complexity and turnover (2006). In 
their 2006 paper, they found that the more diversified the product line of the firm, the 
smaller the likelihood of turnover. In fact, they found “ that CEO turnover is completely 
insensitive to both accounting and stock-price performance in diversified firms.  In 
contrast, CEO turnover in focused firms is sensitive to both accounting and stock price 
performance.”  In a large study of 4820 firm year observations for 502 firms in 1990, 
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they examined turnover by changes in the identity of the CEO.  They examined focused 
firms versus diversified firms and saw that in the diversified firms, the likelihood of 
turnover was almost completely insensitive to accounting and stock price performance. 
They defined diversification in two ways:  (1) setting an indicator variable to 1 if the firm 
operates in multiple business segments, and (2) they also used 1 minus the Herfindahl 
index. They claimed that firms with a zero for this factor were single segment firms and 
placed lower weight on the smaller segments. Since Herfindahl is a measure of industry 
concentration, this measure might be less than transparent.  They also identified whether 
the turnover was forced or voluntary by identifying whether the CEO left before the age 
of 60 and listed any reasons other than death, illness, or acceptance of a position within or 
outside the firm unrelated to the firm’s activities.  The research revealed several 
interesting facts that could be the cause of increased costs of finding CEOs in diversified 
firms.  CEOs of diversified firms tend to be older  (by more than a year) and have shorter 
tenures, higher levels of fixed pay and have named a successor to the CEO position.  The 
final results showed a lower incidence of CEO turnover in diversified firms. Only 11.1 
percent of turnovers are forced in diversified firms as compared to 17.8 percent in 
focused firms. Their research found that due to the complex nature of the diversified 
firms, the additional costs associated with the replacement of the CEOs of reduced the 
incidence of turnover.  This research leaves much more room for determining the factors 
of organizational structures and organizational costs of replacing top management.  
This research proposes to continue where previous research concluded by 
examining how international diversification impacts CEO turnover.  Naturally, an 
international firm has the most complex type of organizational structure a business can 
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have.  In theory, the turnover should be the smallest for the most complex form of 
organization.  So the question is, does international diversification limit or reduce CEO 
turnover in financially distressed firms? 
 More and more firms are making the choice to enter global markets. A recent 
quote by a retail analyst, Matt Winn, reflects the issue in most markets, “Most established 
retail markets have little room to grow within their own countries.”   With this being said, 
the only place to go is into other international markets.  This holds true with retail and 
most other sectors of the economy.  Whether it is for the increase in market share when 
domestic market shares stagnate, or because of the lure of cheaper labor, many 
corporations are making the move into international waters. The study of international 
diversification has dominated research in the last decade. As our world becomes more 
and more global, research has attempted to determine the impact of globalization on 
business.  Researchers have studied types of internationalization, impact on sales, 
increases in agency issues, the complication of information systems, information demand, 
and the list goes on and on.  The purpose of this section is to review the research on 
globalization and the gaps in the literature that this paper proposes to fill. 
 The cultural, language and geographic distances between parent company and 
international segment alone can be extremely difficult to manage.  As one may assume, 
much literature has been devoted to the study of this challenge to the top managerial 
team. Given the increased level of complexity in managing an international firm, top 
managers’ abilities must be greater to meet the needs of the more complex firm.  Sanders 
and Carpenter in 1998 found that CEOs were compensated differently when they 
managed a multi-national firm due to its increased complexity.  The complexity was 
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attributed to two factors:  (1)  the diversity of cultures of the international firm (as 
portrayed by Hofstede’s cultural measures) and, (2) the necessity of creating synergies 
across product and geographic markets.  In studying more than 250 firms with similar 
size and performance, they discovered many factors about international firms.  Degree of 
internationalization was measured using Sullivan’s (1994) composite measure which 
measures three variables:  (1) foreign sales as a ratio of total sales, (2) foreign production 
as measured by foreign assets as a percentage of total assets, and finally (3) geographic 
dispersion which measured the number of countries where the firm had subsidiaries in 
operation.  These three measures were summed to form a composite measure of 
internationalization from 0 to 3.  The international firm’s manager will have greater 
decision options than the non-diversified firm.  This will require greater managerial 
discretion and intuition. The researchers found that board size and composition were 
associated with internationalization.  Sanders and Carpenter also found these 
international managers’ contracts were typically longer and more focused on salary-based 
pay and long-term incentives.  The reasoning behind this was the determination that the 
information processing demands and agency issues of international firms were so 
complicated that “normal” pay structures could not correctly accommodate the CEO and 
management teams.  This greater degree of complexity of decision-making and 
information processing is another reason replacing international managers is more 
challenging than their domestic counterparts.  
In a later research Carpenter, Sanders and Gregerson (2001) found that CEOs 
with international experience actually “create value for their firms and themselves 
through their control of a “valuable, rare, and inimitable resource.”  Their results showed 
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that firms with CEOs with international experience performed better.  This makes the 
pool for CEOs with international experience valuable and smaller than pools for other 
executives.  If it is both costly to replace and difficult to find CEOs with international 
experience, turnover in these firms with experienced CEOs at the helm should be lower. 
Citing both the resource-based theory of the firm’s growth, competitive advantage and 
the new dynamic capabilities of the firm, they examined 245 multinational firms and 
found previous experience did create value for the firm.  They also found that the number 
of CEOs with valuable international experience was limited. In fact, their research 
showed less than 1 in 5 top managers in international firms had such experience, usually 
less than one year.  They found “the forces of causal ambiguity, social complexity, and 
competitive labor markets contribute to both the rarity and inimitability of international 
assignment experience among CEO candidates.”  If the complexity of the job makes a 
smaller pool of truly qualified CEO candidates, the mere act of entering an international 
market reduced the likelihood of CEO turnover, thus digging the entrenchment even 
deeper. 
While the complexity of replacing a CEO is a valid area of study, one must include an 
examination of other possible explanations for a CEOs departure. Some research focused 
on mergers and acquisitions. Extensive research has been conducted on the CEOs of the 
target firms. Studies show that U.S. target firms should expect to lose two-thirds of their 
executives within five years of acquisition (Walsh, 1988).  Departures will be even higher 
when the acquirer is foreign (Krug and Hegarty, 1997).   
The following factors have been attributed to CEO succession in general:  age, size of 
the firm, condition of its founding, sector of activity, variability of profits in its industry, 
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current and past performance, structure, composition and allegiances of the board of 
directors, power of the incumbent CEO with respect to the board, personal characteristics 
of the CEO, and availability of alternative candidates (Pitcher, Chreim, and Kisfalvi, 
2000).  The difficulty of measuring CEO succession is due to the large number of 
variables that must be considered when evaluating determinants of succession.   
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) found that the probability of top executive turnover is 
negatively related to the ownership of the officers and directors. They also found it was 
positively related to the presence of an outside shareholder or block holder.  The authors 
also found increased corporate control activity during the months preceding the 
executive’s turnover.  This leads to the conclusion that board will have an impact on the 
survival of the top managers.  The board is considered a monitor for the shareholders of 
the activities of top management.  But the board structure can falter or inhibit this 
process. 
 Kang and Shivdasani (1995) found top executive turnover was related to 
performance.  Specifically, they found that top executive turnover was related to 
industry-adjusted return on assets, excess returns, and negative pre-tax earnings.  A 
botched international entrance into a new market can create all of these results.  
Therefore, executive turnover could be linked to the failure in the entry into a new 
market.  Kang and Shivdasani’s work was limited to Japanese firms so more research 
should be done to fill this gap in the literature. 
 Kang and Shivdasani worked again on this topic in 1997.  They once again 
studied firms in Japan in hopes of linking restructuring during declines to top executive 
turnover.  They studied 92 firms between 1986 and 1990 (comparing U.S. and Japanese 
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firms) and found that many downsizing measures, including layoffs of top management, 
took place after a decline in operating performance. There was a correlation between the 
downsizing and increases in ownership of the firm by the main bank and other block 
holders. In fact, block holders increased the probability of executive turnover 
significantly.  The limited size of the sample leaves room for further study on this topic. 
 Sanders and Carpenter, as previously mentioned, found that internationalization 
resulted in changes in the roles of CEOs, their compensation and board structure (1998).  
In fact, they found that along with greater compensation, the roles of CEO and chairman 
of the board were often separated. All of this suggests that these roles undergo many 
changes after entering a new international market.  Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) linked 
changes in board structure to executive turnover.  
When an entry into a foreign market fails, the CEO will suffer from potential 
incentive pay losses.  And the failure typically includes a loss of investment, which is 
usually quite large, and an even larger loss could be forthcoming in future developments.  
This could in many instances be considered poor performance which has been linked as a 
key determinant in CEO dismissal (Kesner and Sebora, 1994).      
The CEO may not lose his/her job but would see a reduction of pay either by 
contract or by stock value losses.  Extremely little has been studied in this area. A quote 
by Harold S. Geneen in an article in Fortune magazine in 1984 summed this up perfectly, 
“When do the directors cut a CEO’s salary?  When disaster strikes, when the ground 
heaves, the walls buckle, and the roof caves in, when the wreckage is all around.  Then 
the board, if it survives, sits up and takes action.” Since Kerr and Bettis mentioned the 
problems with CEO compensation in their 1984 paper, this is hardly a new problem.  But 
	  	  
21	  
the news releases concerning AIG, Bear Sterns, Goldman Sachs and many others should 
have stimulated more study in this area.  But the researcher found little valuable literature 
which focused on the reduction in pay of CEOs.  This is most probably because CEO 
salaries are seldom reduced, but they may not receive the incentive packages that are 
associated with success.  There is also the problem iterated by Conger and Nadler in their 
2004 article, “When CEOs Step Up to Fail.”  The cost of replacing a CEO is 
astronomical.  Between the severance packages and recruiting of a new CEO, the firm is 
out millions of dollars.  The typical severance package contains a salary worth two or 
three times the CEO’s normal annual salary, plus compensation for life insurance and 
some include annual payments for the lifetime of the CEO of up to a million dollars 
annually.  This is not an easy or inexpensive task. 
The previous research leaves a certain hole in the literature which this research 
will fill.  This paper suggests that CEO turnover in distressed firms which are more 
multinational will be lower than firms who are operating solely in a domestic market. 
Gilson (1990, 1993) found that turnover is greater in distressed firms. Berry et al (2006) 
found that firms that have product diversification  are less likely to see CEO turnover due 
to accounting and stock price performance. This paper proposes to answer this question. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 CEOs make decisions daily about the directions their firms will go and truly 
determine their success.  Once a firm enters the international market, this job becomes 
more complex.  As Sanders, Carpenter and Gregerson wrote, CEOs “create value for their 
firms and themselves through their control of a valuable, rare, and inimitable resource.”  
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If this position is so important, the loss of the CEO can be catastrophic to the firm in 
morale and future revenues.  
Due to its costly nature, CEO turnover has been linked to firms in distress – where 
the losses are already so high and that the last resort is to start fresh from the top 
managerial position. Gilson (1990, 1993) found that anywhere from one-third to one-half 
of the CEOs of financially distressed firms would be forcibly removed. The benefits of 
replacing the CEO must be greater than the costs of the replacement process.  The more 
complex is the firm, the more difficult will be finding the replacement CEO.  
Theories 
The literature gives three streams of theories to explain the difficult and lengthy 
process of replacing a CEO . (1) Scarcity or Ability Matching Theory: The supply of 
qualified candidates for managing diversified firms is small (Rose and Shepard, 1997; 
Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon & Naveen 2006). (2) Cost of Replacement or Entrenchment 
Theory : Replacement costs are higher when the firms are more diversified (Schleifer and 
Vishny, 1989).  These first two theories are often put into categories as the capability 
versus the entrenchment theories, or the improved management theories.  (3) Scapegoat 
Theory: Performance improves upon replacement of a manager as a scapegoat (Huson et 
al, 2004).  This theory is linked to the idea that managerial quality, or poor performance, 
is linked to “bad luck” not bad management. “In equilibrium, all managers supply the 
same effort (or quality) and only those who are unlucky are fired.  Boards of directors 
understand that all managers are alike, but must fire managers of poorly performing firms 
to induce other managers to provide the desired level of effort (Huson et al., 2004).” 
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(1) Scarcity Theories: Scarcity explanation has gained support in recent years.  
Rose and Shepard (1997) studied the pay among 473 CEOs during the years of 1985-
1990 and found that premia were definitely paid to CEOs of diversified firms. CEOs of 
firms with at least two lines of businesses were paid an average of 12% more than those 
of non-diversified firms.  They also examined the pay structure of new and experienced 
CEOs. If ability matching argument is dominant over the entrenchment argument, one 
should see higher pay for greater experience.  They found, however, that the 
diversification premia were approximately the same for both new and experienced CEOs 
with an average of 11 more years of experience. The ability matching argument would 
cause the premium for new and experienced CEOs to be nearly equal.  Rose and Shepard 
also stated the ability matching argument would show “that the premium earned by an 
experienced CEO who had diversified the firm will be lower than the premium earned by 
a CEO hired to manage an already diversified firm.” The entrenchment argument should 
show a higher premia for the diversifying manager.   Rose and Shepard did find that 
diversification actually reduced compensation. The fact that most CEOs were not paid 
premia for experience lends support to the argument that CEOs are hired according to 
ability, not the entrenchment created through diversification. 
(2) Entrenchment Theories: The second argument focused on agency problems.  
The idea is that “entrenched senior managers may use their position to increase 
diversification and their own compensation contrary to shareholder interests.”   
The entrenchment theory suggests that CEOs enter foreign markets to increase 
their value to the firm so that the cost of replacing them becomes too large to consider 
except in the most extreme circumstances.  Management ownership can “exacerbate” 
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agency problems by “reducing the effectiveness of corporate control mechanisms”(Iqbal 
& French, 2007).  CEOs reduce the effectiveness of monitoring through control of large 
shares of stock to boosting their influence on the board of directors (Dann & DeAngelo, 
1988; Weisbach, 1988). Some managers use this to entrench themselves.  If the equity 
held by the CEO is large enough, it becomes increasingly more difficult to replace 
him/her due to their influence and the cost of buyout.  Rose and Shepard (1997) argued 
that CEO compensation actually declined during diversification somewhat reducing this 
argument’s appeal.  
(3) Scapegoat Theories: The final theory addresses the concept that CEOs are 
only figureheads and CEOs are equivalent therefore easily replaced. Huson et al (2004) 
give the scapegoat explanation based on the concept that one manager is as good as 
another and the firm will have the next leader step up to control the firm in the event of 
the departure of the CEO.  The departing CEO will be used as a scapegoat for the 
previous poor performance of the firm, and gives shareholders a “good news” effect 
previewing an increase in financial performance.  They lend much support to Denis and 
Denis (1995) who also found increased performance in firms after a CEO turnover 
announcement. Huson et al (2004) also supported Gilson’s previous work that CEO 
turnover will typically follow declining firm performance and that both financial and 
managerial performance increase following management turnover. 
Although these three explanations have vast amounts of research backing each up, 
the literature lacks depth in the examination of multinational firms and CEO turnover and 
the explanations behind the turnovers. If the complexity of the organization only 
increases as the firm enters international markets (Carpenter et al, 2001; Duru and Reeb, 
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2002), the replacement of CEOs of international firms must be even more costly.  Prior 
research has even gone so far to say that CEOs with international experience can add 
value (Carpenter et al, 2001).  Many researchers have studied and found that most CEOs 
are very homogeneous in nature.  That even while bringing some impressive backgrounds 
to their position, they often are white males, have long tenure with the firm, are graduates 
of prestigious graduate schools, and have backgrounds in finance or law. Regardless of 
the reasons the CEOs entered the foreign market or where they have come from, they 
have deepened the unique and valuable resource by entering a foreign market.  They have 
made themselves much more difficult to replace.  If the management of a diversified firm 
is more complex, then locating managers with the skill set to manage in this complex 
environment would be more difficult. The harder and more lengthy the time to find 
managers the more costly the search will be.     
Research has also found that monitoring CEOs abroad is more difficult 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Nilakant and Rao.1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1994, Sanders and 
Carpenter, 1998). The distance and the complex nature of decision-making in 
international firms make monitoring each decision tedious and practically impossible. 
Thus, we will expect turnover in multinational firms, even in distress, to be less than their 
domestic counterparts.  These theories lead to different hypotheses that will be addressed 
by this paper. 
 
Corporate Multi-nationality and CEO Pay 
Management of a MNE is an extremely challenging job.  It requires knowledge of 
more than one culture and economic system. All three CEO turnover arguments address 
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the compensation of CEOs. The capability theory argues that the new CEO will be 
compensated the same as the incumbent CEOs in the market.  They will have pay the 
same to entice those with appropriate credentials to take the job. With these greater 
responsibilities comes a greater capability, thus making it necessary to pay more to the 
individual who can meet the challenges of such a position.  Existing CEOs must have 
been paid at a higher level than those of domestic firms.  
The entrenchment theory predicts that CEO of an MNE can entrench themselves 
by building the complex multinational operations.  He/she will make themselves 
indispensible to operations because of the advanced needs of the MNE.  Over time, the 
compensation level will rise through the increased scale of the firm.  So the CEO will 
start at a lower level and in time, increase his pay and perks through the support of the 
board.  
The scapegoat theory argues that multi-nationality has no impact on pay 
whatsoever.  Since managerial ability is generic and can be easily replaced, there should 
be no difference between the new and incumbent CEO’s pay level or structure. Since any 
CEO can take over any job – there is no need to pay more for multi-national experience. 
Different theories predict different pay levels between multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
and domestic enterprises (DEs) CEOs, and we state the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Pay level of the CEOs of MNEs is different from that of similar DE 
CEOs, cet. par. 
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Corporate Multi-nationality and CEO Pay Structure 
Previous research on the pay of the CEO of multinational firms has found a few 
key similar components . The compensation of CEOs of international firms is structured 
more on salary and long-term outcomes (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998; Carpenter et 
al,2001; Rose and Shepard, 1997;Duru and Reeb, 2002). Rose and Shepard found an 
increase in compensation of up to 13% for domestically diversified firms with varied 
product lines. Duru and Reeb (2002) found that geographic diversification provides a 
compensation premium.  They found that diversification could cause compensation 
contracts to be different with a greater reliance on market based measures of success than 
accounting based measures. They also found that CEOs of a firm with geographic 
diversification would be rewarded if the diversification was seen as value-enhancing.  
If CEOs of MNEs are compensated more, then the cost of replacing them would 
be greater. The monitoring of CEO becomes a greater challenge when the firm crosses 
many countries and time zones. Therefore the structure of the pay level should include a 
bonding aspect, according to agency theory, attempting to align CEO interests with those 
of the shareholders through the pay structure.    
As with the compensation level argument, all three theories have arguments on 
the pay for performance issue.  Under the ability theory, manager capabilities tend to vary 
and in order to attract the best CEOs available, the firms have to offer performance-
sensitive pay packages. But the entrenchment argument would state that since the CEO of 
the MNE is entrenched, they will want a stable pay package, less sensitive to 
performance.  If a manager goes so far as to increase multi-nationality to entrench 
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himself/herself, they will not want to lower their impact but to remain stable regardless of 
sales performance or distress. 
Finally, the scapegoat theory would argue that with no difference in managerial 
capability, firms have no need of incentive-based compensation in either a multi-national 
firm or a domestic firm.  All pay should be the same since all managers are of equal 
capability.  The pool of qualified candidates is in effect endless and another manager can 
always be found to fill the role of CEO. Three theories would predict different pay 
structures of MNEs relative to DEs, and we state the next hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  CEO pay for performance sensitivity is different between MNEs and 
DEs, cet. par.  
 
 
Corporate Multi-nationality and CEO Turnover in Financial Distress 
The decision to fire or replace the CEO is one of the most important decisions a 
company can make.  From Gilson’s early work in the late 1980’s and early 1990s, 
turnover has been linked to distressed firms.  Gilson (1990) found that 52% of firms in 
distress experience a turnover in top management.  In 1993, he went on to look more 
closely at the turnover problem, and found that one-third of all CEOs were replaced and 
that of those that remained, salary and bonus reductions were probable.  After this initial 
study, many more researchers attacked the problem.  Lehn and Zhao (2006) found that 
47% of CEOs of acquired firms are replaced within five years.  Berry et al (2006) found 
that the more complex the firm in terms of product lines, the less chance of turnover in 
top management.  Iqbal and French (2007) furthered research by finding that managers 
who own larger stakes are less likely to be replaced.  Tsai et al found that diversified 
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firms are less likely to turnover than non-diversified firms, even in distress. Huson et al 
found that in spite of increased monitoring in firms, turnover rates remain relatively 
steady.  Sanders and Carpenter (1998, 2001) found that CEOs of international firms are 
paid more due to the complexity of job across global boundaries. All of these previous 
papers failed to include the international presence of the firm as a contributing factor to 
turnover.  
Multinationality has been seen to impact a corporation in a variety of ways.  The 
increased complexity is seen in the financial division.  Contracts must be determined in a 
variety of currencies.  Payment format is different in each country.  The intricacies of 
installment payments or credit vary from country to country. And the forecasting of what 
exchange rates will do require an entire team of currency experts. Human resources are 
vastly different.  For example, in the United Kingdom employees are not willing to work 
at all on certain days even in an emergency.  And understanding of Human Resource 
regulations is necessary by country.  Some countries do not allow women to hold 
positions within a company and some require certain daily allowances – including 
religious and cultural differences.  In certain countries, like Italy, lunch is from 3-5 pm 
and employees typically work until 7-8 pm each night.  Lunches are typically no less than 
2 hours long.  These are just a few of the challenges that face an international 
organization.  And the greater the number of countries the firm operates in, the greater 
the difficulty of managing such an organization. All of these complexities are seen to at 
least raise the pay level. 
As was shown in the Sanders and Carpenter paper, if multinationality impacts 
pay, it will impact the entire firm – including turnover.  Finding and retaining good 
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employees – even CEOs becomes a greater challenge. International impact is a missing 
variable that will be examined in this third hypothesis. One again, the three theories 
discussed in this paper each lead to certain conclusions that can be applied to 
international firms. 
These three theories once again come up with diverging reasons for the turnover 
of CEOs in distressed MNEs and DEs.  According to the capability theory, the very fact 
that a firm is in distress is proof that the incumbent CEO is incapable of managing a 
complex multi-national enterprise.  In an effort to recoup losses and turn the organization 
around, the MNE will replace the existing CEO with a more capable CEO.  Due to the 
complexity of the international firm, the pool of capable candidates to fill the role of CEO 
shrinks.  This very complexity (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998) will lead to difficulty in 
replacing the CEO. This new, more capable CEO will have to paid for this exceptional 
capability.  
 On the entrenchment side of the argument, the CEO has entrenched himself with 
money, stock and skills that cannot be replaced.  The structure of the MNE being so 
complex, replacement is an act of last resort.  And the probability of finding a CEO that 
can manage the complex organization becomes very small. Since the CEO has more 
power and influence due to the entrenchment, whether from the purchase of shares in the 
firm or entering an international market, the likelihood of replacement decreases. 
Therefore, turnover in the MNE is less likely to occur. 
 And finally, the scapegoat theory says there will be no difference in the turnover 
of the multinational enterprise than that of a domestic enterprise.  One CEO is as good as 
another and a replacement can be found easily from within or outside the firm. The CEO 
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is simply the scapegoat who is fired for blame of the financial distress and the new CEO 
will take over the role to lead it out of their financial woes.   Hence the next hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
 
Hypothesis 3: CEO turnovers at MNEs in financial distress are different from those in 
DEs in distress, cet. par. 
 
 
Corporate Multi-nationality and Pay Level of Succeeding CEOs 
Once the new CEO takes over, the next question arises.  Will the new CEO 
receive the same perks as the existing, or past, CEOs? The next hypothesis addressed the 
pay level of CEOs after a turnover has taken place. Here, once again, we see competing 
arguments.  The capability theory argues that the old CEOs are found not capable of 
managing their firms; hence replaced. The firms should hire a more capable manager.  
With this new manager’s capabilities comes the requirement of higher pay. To find and 
retain the best, the firm must be willing to pay more.  If this skill set is greater than one 
would see in a domestic firm, then the pay will reflect the greater skill set.  Rose and 
Shepard (1997) found that compensation for new CEO’s was roughly similar to existing 
CEO’s. And, in fact, product diversification during the sample period, holding all else 
constant, “appear to reduce rather than increase compensation”.  If in a product 
diversified firm, the compensation does not significantly change, the logical conclusion is 
that for an internationally diversified firm, similar results might be seen. Berry et al 
(2006) found that replacement CEOs tend to be older and more educated than their 
counterparts in focused firms.  They also found that after controlling for other pay 
determinants, that “new CEOs of diversified firms are paid more when hired relative to 
	  	  
32	  
new CEOs of focused firms.” This lends support to the notion that CEOs are replaced to 
gain a greater skill level in the position. International firms require even more skills to 
manage the complexity of multiple countries and cultures. And these greater skills will 
require greater pay. 
The entrenchment arguments are based on the board reaction to the leaving of an 
entrenched manager.  If the firm is well-governed, then after removing the entrenched 
manager, the board will restructure the CEO compensation structure but the new CEO’s 
pay level will not be greater than the used-to-entrenched but departing CEO’s.  Since 
formerly entrenched CEOs hyped up their own pay, the board is likely to set the new 
CEO’s pay level below the previous level. Since monitoring is increasingly difficult in 
international firms, this becomes a difficult process (Sanders & Carpenter, 2001).  The 
board of a company where the former CEO had entrenched himself will want to limit the 
ability of the new CEO to do the same. Berry et al. (2006) found limited restructuring in 
firms where the diversification was a value-adding endeavor. Therefore, the 
entrenchment argument would suggest limited changed to the CEOs pay level but a 
greater change in the pay structure. 
Finally, the scapegoat theory says all CEOs are indifferent in capabilities, and 
argues that CEO pay level will not be different between MNEs and DEs. If the poor 
performance is a result of bad luck and not poor management, then a change to pay level 
is not necessary. As the argument states, if one set of abilities is the same as the next, 
there is no need for increased pay. As they stated before, one CEO is as good as another – 
why would the pay be any different? 
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Hypothesis 4:  The pay level of succeeding CEOs in MNEs will be different from that 
in similar DEs, cet par. 
 
 
Corporate Multi-nationality and Pay Structure of Succeeding CEOs 
 
The final hypothesis addresses the pay structure of the new CEO compared to the 
departing CEO. The capability theory will argue that the failure of the predecessor 
reflects the complexity of the organization, therefore requires a more incentive-based 
compensation structure to attract more capable managers. Sanders and Carpenter (1998) 
argued that with internationalization comes greater complexity.  This complexity will 
cause a greater need for more efficient monitoring and governance arrangement.  This 
greater level of monitoring will require a greater dependence on performance measures as 
a monitoring device.  The entire uncertainty surrounding an international firm will 
necessitate some other form of compensation because the natural increased necessity of 
agent discretion as the operation grows into international markets. Berry et al (2006) 
stated that “taken as a whole, the evidence is most consistent with the notion that the 
higher CEO replacement costs in diversified firms are driven by the need for higher 
ability CEOs to manager more complex asset structure in diversified firms.”  If 
diversified firms require a greater ability, how much more will the need be for a CEO 
with abilities to manage an internationally diversified firm? 
The entrenchment theory will argue that the board will restructure the 
compensation structure that does not allow the new CEO the entrenched state of the 
previous CEO.  MNEs have more complex operations than DEs, and cannot be monitored 
so easily as DEs.. The board will moderate the cash-based compensation structure of the 
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entrenched previous CEO to industry standards; hence, more incentive-based 
compensation structure is expected for new CEOs under entrenchment hypothesis. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) suggest that if diversification is a result of entrenchment, then 
a greater degree of restructuring should take place.  With the complexity of monitoring 
international operations, the board will need to restructure the compensation with the goal 
of limiting entrenchment while increasing performance incentives, which are in line with 
goals of shareholders. One would expect a significant change in the structure of the pay 
level of the new CEO. Huson et al (2001) found that while monitoring mechanisms have 
changed, the turnover level has not.  Therefore, international firms when replacing CEOs 
will see a change in the monitoring mechanisms, both internal and external.  These 
mechanisms will include pay structure changes that will enhance the performance of the 
CEO and limit the ability of the CEO to further entrench himself. 
And finally, the scapegoat theory will say that no difference will exist between 
any CEO’s pay – no matter the credential, abilities or experience of the new CEO.  Nor 
will the complexity of the organization impact the pay. If the turnover and poor firm 
performance were due to bad luck, changing the structure or level of the pay will not 
make any difference.  One CEO is as good as another. This leads to hypothesis 5: 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Pay structure of succeeding CEOs in MNEs will be different from that 
in DEs, cet. Par. 
 
 
This paper will contribute to literature in two ways:  (1) it will identify if 
distressed firms that are internationally diversified have a reduced rate of CEO turnover 
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than domestic firms and (2) if the replacement CEOs of international firms receive 
different compensation levels from domestic firms. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Introduction: 
To determine whether international diversification impacts turnover, the 
hypotheses should be studied under the conditions that would make turnover most likely 
to occur.  Therefore, the methodology will follow past research that has been successful 
in determining impact factors on turnover.  To examine the turnover stages within a firm, 
this study will begin by identifying firms under financial distress during the years of 
2003-2008. This time period was chosen to allow sufficient time of study after the firm 
enters distress.  The turnover often does not happen immediately upon entering a status of 
financial distress.  And many of the firms were listed as distressed for many quarters of 
the study. A sufficient time is needed to determine if the firm forced a turnover in the 
executive position. A point of further research would be to study firms during the Great 
Recession and determine if the recessionary factors increase the instances of CEO 
turnover but that research will be saved for a future date. 
For the purpose of this research, a firm is considered in financial distress if it has 
reported four or more quarters of negative earnings after taxes within an eight-quarter 
period following twelve consecutive profitable quarters (Iqbal and French, 2007). Firms 
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that have declared bankruptcy or are restructuring debt will also be considered to be in 
distress (Gilson, 1989).  These firms will only include non-financial and non-utility 
corporations. 
Following Iqbal and French’s (2007) methodology, companies in financial 
distress will be found using Compustat database for years beginning in January 2004 and 
completing in December 2008.  This time frame will allow four full years to examine if 
changes in CEO status took place. This will also allow an examination of bankruptcy 
filings during the years following distress. 
Turnovers will be screened using Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, 
Directors and Executives (S&P Register) and Lexis Nexis with a follow-up examination 
of public announcements in the Wall Street Journal. A collection will be drawn of the 
names of the top executives of the firms in financial distress in the year prior to the first 
quarterly loss.  The positions with the titles of CEO, Chairman, President or some 
combination of those titles will be examined.  Some corporations combine these 
positions/title while others may have three separate positions.  For this reason, there may 
be more executives than firms examined. Data on the executives will be drawn from the 
ExecuComp data set and Forbes annual compensation surveys.  Data will include name, 
age, tenure, education, compensation, and founder status.  These factors are needed to 
rule out any reasons for leaving other than distress. These variables also vary with the 
level the complexity of the organization. As was found in previous research, higher 
compensation often indicates a higher level of complexity such as in multiple lines of 
business (Rose and Shepherd, 1997).  An increased compensation package could also 
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show a greater reason for keeping the CEO regardless of the financial distress of the firm 
(Rose and Shepard, 1997; Iqbal and French, 2007). 
 
 
Data Description: 
 
CEO Characteristics:  
An increased age could signify that the leaving was retirement and not forced. 
Thus the variable CEOAGE will represent the age of the CEO when hired.  The variable 
of tenure will be represented by CEOTEN and will represent the number of years the 
CEO has been at his current position. Some research has shown a shorter tenure among 
product diversified firms (Rose and Shepherd, 1997).  Recent research has also shown a 
link between age and education of product diversified firms.  “CEO’s of product 
diversified firms tend to be older and more educated than their counterparts in focused 
firms” (Berry et al , 2006). Therefore, the researchers will include the variable 
CEO(EDUC) to control for this possible complexity.  Another variable listing if the CEO 
is the founder of the firm will be included as CEOFOUND. And finally, if the CEO 
carries the title of both CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors can also impact pay 
level.  These variables will be studied also. 
Compensation Measures: Compensation data will be examined using several 
measures.  The salary data will be gathered from the Execucomp data set. The first is 
salary, other compensation and bonus (TDC1).   This measure is utilized by the Execomp 
DataSet and is formally defined as follows: TDC1 is a compensation measure calculated 
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under the 1992 reporting format.  It is comprised of the following:  Salary, Bonus, Other 
Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options (using 
Black and Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. This measure 
will include both current and deferred salary compensation.  This component is 
straightforward across the time period examined. A similar but necessary compensation 
measure is labeled TDC2 and is also defined by the Execucomp DataSet (still using the 
1992 format of reporting) as follows: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Restricted Stock 
Option Grants, Long-term Payouts and All Other plus the adddition of Value of Options 
Exercised. This second compensation measure will include a more inclusive set of data.  
Labeled total compensation (TDC2), it will include benefits, long-term and contingent 
compensation, and net gains from the exercise of any stock options exercised. It will also 
include stock option rights and stock accrual rights – which are generally called 
“options.” This process follows previous work done in this area by Rose and Shepard 
(1997). As was found in their research, it is expected to find different measures for real 
SALARY for the domestic firms than the international firms.  The final dependent 
variable examined was a perk variable.  It is defined in Execomp as OtherAnn or Other 
annual compensation not categorized as salary or bonus.  This variable is labeled 
PERFPAY and is defined by Execucomp as the following:  
1) Perquisites and other personal benefits 
2) Above market earnings on restricted stock, options/SARs or deferred 
compensation paid during the year but deferred by the officer 
3) Earnings on long-term incentive plan compensation paid during the year but 
deferred at the election of the officer 
4) Tax Reimbursements 
5) The dollar value of differences between the price paid by the officer 
for company stock and the actual value of the stock under a stock purchase plan 
that is not generally available to shareholders or employees of the company. 
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These three variables will be tested for all old and, when occurring, new CEOs. 
 
Firm Characteristics: Research will also be gathered on firm characteristics.  
Since firm characteristics can impact executive compensation, the research will examine 
level of product and international diversification, size, board of directors and, as 
previously mentioned, financial performance. The two measures of diversification will 
include a product diversification measure. Based on the number of business segments in 
which the firm operates and dividing them into single and multi-segment designations 
(MULTISEG).  Previous research has linked multi-level segments to higher pay and must 
be accounted for (Rose and Shepard, 1997; Berry et al, 2006). Table 1, seen below, 
defines each variable and describes their interpretation. 
Size will be measured by both sales and number of employees – SALES and 
EMP.  Since larger firms tend to have higher compensation for CEOs this must be taken 
into consideration. Logs were not needed when the data was run with the dependent 
variables.  
Board of directors make-up and control mechanisms have also been linked to 
CEO compensation level and structure.  Previous research has linked that board 
mechanisms that have been set in place to monitor executives behavior are key in both 
controlling and motivating top management teams (Jenson & Murphy, 1990).  Some of 
these governance methods are seen in CEO compensation.  This is often controlled by a 
compensation committee or consultant (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).   
Size of the board has also been linked to the complexity function of a firm. The 
more levels of internationalization the larger the board size is expected to be (Sanders & 
Carpenter, 1998). A long-standing, and often cited, set of research in this topic was 
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published by Zald in 1969.  Where he found a direct link between size of the firm and 
size of the board of directors. Other research has found that firms will often add board 
members with expertise in the area of the work in which the firm is branching (Pfeffer, 
1972).  Carpenter et al. (1998) also went on to study the makeup of the board in relation 
to its degree of internationalization.  Carpenter proposed that the proportion of outsiders 
on the board was negatively associated with the degree of internationalization.  So the 
greater the degree of internationalization, the lower the proportion of outsiders on the 
board. He proposed that insider board members actually become more important as the 
degree of internationalization increases.  
Anderson (2000) found that corporate governance is sensitive to levels of 
diversification.  They studied focused versus non-focused firms.  Anderson also found an 
increase in the board size went with the increase in product segments. He also found the 
fraction of outside directors increased with multiple segment firms. And while they found 
the boards larger, it was not statistically significant.  And they could find no relation 
between the difference in diversified firms and boards and CEO turnover.  
Much research has focused on the size and makeup of the board of directors as it 
relates to its ability to monitor CEOs and top management.  Weisbach (1988) found that 
outside directors are more likely to replace CEOs than inside directors.  Typically this 
reluctance to challenge the poor managerial decisions is due to the cost to the insider of 
challenging a manager in a higher position. 
This paper proposes to examine the size of the board of directors (BODSZ) of the 
international versus the domestic firms, if time and data restrictions allow. A second 
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board of directors variable proposed in this study is  the number of outsiders on the board 
(BODOUT), time permitting. 
A final firm variable will be the leverage ratio of the firm.  Recent research has 
linked the leverage ratio to compensation.  Lin et al (2012) found a positive relationship 
between stock incentives and the debt ratio of the firm.  Using the leverage ratio 
(LEVRAT), this paper will examine this variable’s impact on the compensation of the 
CEO. A similar study examined the level of debt and CEO pay and found an inverse 
relationship (Ortiz-Molina, 2007). Since it has already been researched, debt will not be 
used in this study. The use of leverage ratio will be universally used for all domestic and 
multinational firms. 
Following the methodology of Iqbal and French (2007). Financial performance 
prior to the period of distress will be examined by one measure: accounting return (EPS).  
The period before the financial distress should illustrate the normal nature of the firm’s 
financial performance.  Since compensation is often linked to performance, this measure 
could show how the initial compensation package was determined. And if it was based 
upon performance measures.  
The turnover will be determined by two methods.  When the executive’s name no 
longer appears in the Execucomp database for two years after the first loss, the 
assumption can be made that the executive was replaced.  A reassignment of title is not 
considered a job loss or top management change.  A second confirmation of job loss will 
be performed by examining the Lexis/Nexis Academic Universe for news of executive 
replacements.  
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The next step will be to gather information on ownership information on the 
executives being examined. A variable representing what percentage share of ownership 
is held by the executive in question will be included (MGTOWN).  This variable is 
necessary since the larger the share of company the executive holds, the more influence 
he would on turnover issues. The percentage owned will be examined for the year before 
the first quarterly loss (Iqbal and French, 2007).  
Diversification Measures: To gather diversification data, the researcher will 
follow the methodology of previous researchers in international research.  International 
diversification will be measured as with several variables.  The first variable is set equal 
to one if the firm reports operations in at least one foreign segment and zero if the firm 
operates only in domestic markets (FORSEG). This measure simply looks at the presence 
in the international market.  The next international diversification variable will look at the 
percentage or ratio of income that come from international markets to company income.  
This ratio will allow the researcher to determine how deep the international factor goes 
and will be labeled FORINC.  A third measure of international diversification is the 
measure of foreign assets to total assets (FORAS).  Finally, the researcher will gather 
information on the number of countries the firm has subsidiaries or operations currently 
operating in (NUMCOUN).     
Methodology: 
The author will examine firms in distress from the years of 2003-2008 as 
described in the previous section. Financial distressed will be identified with the method 
shown in Iqbal and French (2007) who followed the approach of DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1990). A firm in financial distress is identified as having reported four or 
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more quarters of negative earnings after taxes within an eight-quarter period following 
twelve consecutive profitable quarters.   
 The companies were screened using Computstat.  With an initial set of 2000 
firms, the data set was very large.  But upon inspection, many firms fit the distress 
criteria for more than one quarter. The author ended the sample in 2008.  This sample had 
to start from 3 years prior to 2004 to get the first set of profitable quarters, as was 
previously shown to work in Iqbal and French (2007).   
  
 
Initial Description of Methodology Per Hypothesis: 
 
Using multiple regression analysis, the researcher will identify whether 
internationalization impacts salary (TDC 1, 2) for the top executives. Then the researcher 
will examine pay for performance (PERFPAY). These two dependent variables have 
similar reactions to the independent variables and will be used in each analysis. 
 Each of these hypothesis use the same core independent variables and will be 
labeled the same for both sets of data and analysis. For each hypothesis the researcher 
will begin with a test of mean differences using both t and nonparametric tests. The 
means test will include a means test of the pay of designated multinational firms with 
those designated at domestic firms.  The mean analysis will identify any actual 
differences in pay between the two groups that might not be explained by the variables 
included in the regression. 
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Using the independent variables of CEOAGE, CEOTEN, CEOEDUC, CEOFOUNDER, 
CEO/CHRM, MGTOWN, FORSEG, FORINC, FORAS, NUMCOUN, SIZE, STKRTN, 
EPS, MULTISEG, BODSZ, BODOUT and LEVRAT.  These variables have been 
discussed above.  Identifying where CEO Salary is impacted by the international 
presence is just the first step.   
 
CEO Characteristics: 
 
CEO will simply be the age of the CEO at the quarter before distress was 
identified. CEOTEN will be the number of years the CEO has been in the position of 
CEO with the same firm.  CEOEDUC will be the number of post high school education 
attained by the CEO.  CEOFOUNDER will be 0 for CEOs who were not founders and 1 
for CEOs who were founders of the firm.  MGTOWN is the percentage of stock owned 
by the CEO at the time of distress. CEO/CHRM will be 0 for a CEO who does not hold 
the role of Chairman of the board and 1 for one who does.  
 
Firm Characteristics: 
 
FORSEG will be defined as the number of foreign market segments the firm 
operates within. MNE/DEis the variable that simply represents whether the firm is 
considered multinational by Compustat. The first will be the variable set equal to one if 
the firm reports operations in multiple international segments and a proxy variable set 
equal to zero if the firm operates only in domestic markets. FORINC is the ratio foreign 
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income to total firm income. FORAS is a ratio of international, or foreign, assets to 
company assets (FORAS). SIZE will measure total number of employees of the firm. 
STKRTN is the percentage return the stock gained/lost prior to the firm entering financial 
distress.  EPS is simply the accounting measure for the firm the year prior to the firm 
entering financial distress. The MULTISEG is a variable to define how many lines of 
business the firm operates in per Rose and Shepard (1997). BODSZ and BODOUT will 
represent the board size and outside proportion and will also serve as a proxy for 
monitoring effectiveness.  
LEVRAT will the leverage ratio measured the year the firm is determined to be in 
distress.  The Debt variable will measure the total level of long term debt the year the 
firm entered distress status. 
 
Interaction Predictions and Precautions: 
Several of these variables will have predicted interaction so the researcher will 
removed each of the two-way interactions one at a time to determine which variables will 
be removed. Most of the multinational variables will predictably have interactions. For 
example, FORAS should have interaction with FORINC and FORSEG because the larger 
the assets, the larger the income. The researcher also predicts there will be some 
interaction between CEOFOUNDER and CEOTEN variables.  Multicollinearity will 
most likely be present between all of the foreign regressors so the researcher will test 
each one individually for strength and impact. These variables will be used for both the 
first and second hypothesis – before and after CEO replacement. 
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Also due to the possible lag of response between dependent variables and the firm 
characteristics.  The lag will need to be limited to a time frame close the distress period 
so a lag no greater than t-1 will be used. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Pay level of the CEOs of MNEs is different from that of similar DE 
CEOs, cet. par. 
 
The planned regression equation will be defined as follows with the b’s 
representing the slope for variables 1 through 10 and the intercept for 0: 
 
TDC1,2 = b0 + b1CEOAGE + b2CEOTEN + b3CEOEDUC + b4CEO/CHRM + 
b5CEOFOUNDER + b6MGTOWN+ b7FORSEG  + b8FORINC + 
b9FORAS+ b10NUMCOUN + b11EMP + b12STKRTN + b13EPS + 
b14MULTISEG + b15LEVRAT+ b16BODSZ + b17BODOUT +ε 
 
Hypothesis 2:  CEO pay for performance sensitivity is different between MNEs and 
DEs, cet. par.  
 
PERFPAY = b0 + b1CEOAGE + b2CEOTEN + b3CEOEDUC + b4CEO/CHRM 
+ b5CEOFOUNDER + b6MGTOWN+ b7FORSEG  + b8FORINC + 
b9FORAS+ b10NUMCOUN + b11EMP + b12STKRTN + b13EPS + 
b14MULTISEG + b15LEVRAT + b16BODSZ + b17BODOUT +ε 
 
Several of these variables will have predicted interaction so the researcher will 
removed one at a time each of the variables illustrating interaction to determine which 
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variables will be removed.  Most of the multinational variables will predictably have 
interactions. For example, FORAS should have interaction with FORINC, FORSEG and 
NUMCOUN because the larger the assets, the larger the income. The researcher also 
predicts there will be some interaction between CEOFOUNDER and CEOTEN variables.   
The researcher will also complete a means test of the pay of designated 
multinational firms with those designated at domestic firms.  This means analysis will 
identify any actual differences in pay between the two groups that might not be explained 
by the variables included in the regression. 
 
Hypothesis 3: CEO turnovers at MNEs in financial distress are different from those in 
DEs in distress, cet. par. 
 
 In the next step of the sample collection, the author will identify the changes in 
top management over the years examined.  The dependent variable examined is 
TURNOVER. This process will be done manually using several sources: Execucomp to 
see who is still listed up to two years after the distress status was attained. Wall Street 
Journal Index and Lexis/Nexis Company Database will be used to confirm the changes.  
When the executive’s name does not appear in the S&P Register in any of the years being 
examined through 2 years after (this is the same method as was used by Iqbal and French 
(2007), the manager will be classified as replaced and the variable TURNOVER will take 
the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. A reassignment of title is not considered replacement. 
From here, the firms are divided into two segments, domestic and international to 
examine whether the percentages of replacement between domestic and international are 
comparable statistically. Examining the percentage of replacements in each group should 
illustrate simply the impact of international on turnover.   
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A further test of logistical regression may be necessary to determine the exact 
impact. From this point, the author will examine the executives that replaced executives 
in office during the financial distress. The logit regression equation is shown below: 
Logit(TURNOVER) = b0 + b1CEOAGE + b2CEOTEN + b3CEOEDUC + 
b4CEO/CHRM + b5CEOFOUNDER + b6MGTOWN+ b7FORSEG  + 
b8FORINC + b9FORAS+ b10NUMCOUN + b11EMP + b12STKRTN + 
b13EPS + b14MULTISEG + b15LEVRAT + b16BODSZ + b17BODOUT 
+ε 
 
Hypotheses 4 and 5: 
 
 As was done for hypotheses 1 and 2, the author will combine these two similar 
regressions due to combined use of the same independent variables.  
 
CEO Characteristics: 
The same data will be gathered on the Age, Experience, and Education of the 
replacement managers.  Salary information on the new CEOs will also be gathered. A 
new variable added to this regression analysis is INSIDE.  This variable will determine 
whether the new CEO was hired from within the company or from outside the company. 
This will lead to the following analysis which mirrors the analysis done in Hypotheses 1 
and 2. The variables discussed above will be used: CEOAGE , CEOEDUC, CEO/CHRM, 
INSIDE.  
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 The previous variables of CEOTEN and CEOFOUND have been removed for the 
obvious reasons of new CEO status would prevent these from being relevant. CEO will 
simply be the age of the CEO at the quarter before distress was identified.  CEOEDUC 
will be the number of post high school education attained by the CEO. MGTOWN is the 
percentage ownership given to the new CEO when hired.  
Where the CEO is recruited and hired from can also impact pay level and 
structure.  Whether the CEO was hired from within the firm, or recruited from outside the 
firm can have a strong impact on pay level. This will be represented by Inside variable 
where 0 is for hired inside the firm and 1 is hired from outside the firm. And finally, if 
the CEO carries the title of both CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors can also 
impact pay level.  This will be represented by the variable CEOCHRM with 0 if the CEO 
does not carry the title of Chairman of the Board and 1 if he does. These variables will be 
studied also. 
 
Firm Characteristics: 
FORSEG will be set equal to one if the firm reports operations in multiple 
international segments and a proxy variable set equal to zero if the firm operates only in 
domestic markets. These are also defined as revenue generating foreign segments. 
FORINC is the ratio of foreign generated income to total firm income. FORAS is a ratio 
of international, or foreign, assets to company assets (FORAS). NUMCOUN is the 
variable that measures the number of different countries the firm operates within. SIZE 
will measure total number of employees of the firm. STKRTN is the percentage return 
the stock gained/lost prior to the hiring of the new CEO.  EPS is simply the accounting 
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measure for the firm the year prior to the hiring of the CEO. The MULTISEG is a 
variable to define how many lines of business the firm operates in per Rose and Shepard 
(1997). BODSZ and BODOUT will also be used in this test to represent the board size 
and outside proportion and will also serve as a proxy for monitoring effectiveness. 
Several of these variables will have predicted interaction so the researcher will 
removed one at a time each of the variables illustrating interaction to determine which 
variables will be removed. Most of the multinational variables will predictably have 
interactions. For example, FORAS should have interaction with FORINC because the 
larger the assets, the larger the income.  
The researcher will also complete a means test of the salary of designated 
multinational firms with those designated at domestic firms.  This means analysis will 
identify any actual differences in pay between the two groups that might not be explained 
by the variables included in the regression. 
Hypothesis 4:  The pay level of succeeding CEOs in MNEs will be different from that 
in similar DEs, cet. par. 
 
The regression equation will be defined as follows: 
TDC1,2 = b0 + b1CEOAGE + + b2CEOEDUC + b3CEOCHRM + b4INSIDE+ 
b5MGTOWN + b6FORSEG  + b7FORINC + b8FORAS+ b9NUMCOUN 
+ b10SIZE +b11STKRTN + b12EPS + b13MULTISEG+ b14LEVRAT + 
b15BODSZ + b16BODOUT +ε 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Pay structure of succeeding CEOs in MNEs will be different from that 
in DEs, cet. Par. 
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The regression equation will be defined as follows: 
PERFPAY(R) = b0 + b1CEOAGE + + b2CEOEDUC + b3CEOCHRM + 
b4INSIDE+ b5MGTOWN + b6FORSEG  + b7FORINC + b8FORAS+ 
b9NUMCOUN + b10SIZE + b11STKRTN + b12EPS + b13MULTISEG+ 
b14LEVRAT +ε 
 
 
Additional Testing:  
The researcher will also complete a means test of the salary and pay for 
performance of designated Multinational firms with those designated at domestic firms.  
This means analysis will identify any actual differences in pay between the two groups 
that might not be explained by the variables included in the regression. 
 
Robustness Tests: 
Several tests will be performed to determine which variables are the best proxies 
for size, including testing Total Assets (TOTAS) and the market value of equity 
(MKTEQ).  There are also many variables that have been suggested to determine the 
level of international integration the firm has undertaken.  All of these variables 
(FORAS,FORSEG, FORINC and NUMCOUN) will be tested to find the correct proxy 
for the degree of international penetration the firm has achieved. 
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Robustness Tests for Endogeneity Issues: 
Tests for robustness for several variables will be conducted upon the completion 
of the initial regression.  Test will be done to test to see if size is best proxied by sales, 
employee numbers and market value of the firm.  
Further tests may need to be performed to control for correlation among the 
dependent and independent variables.  Upon completion of the initial testing, the 
researcher will take appropriate steps to test for correlation among all variables and make 
adjustments as necessary.  Several of the variables within the regression equation have 
serious correlation issues. For example, size should be strongly correlated with Salary, 
Sales, EPS, and even several of the variables designed to measure foreign integration.  
Several test will need to be completed to test which variable is the best to use and for 
which time period it should be used. A lagging of variables has been used in previous 
work to control for endogeneity (Brick et al, 2006). 
 
Lagged Variables: 
There may be a need to test for correlation with some previous variables. 
Variables such as SALARY may be tied to previous firm size or sales.  Since Salaries are 
often set on previous data.  So the Salary data will also be run with lagged firm variables 
by one year and will be designated with t-1 to differentiate between current firm 
characteristics and past firm characteristics.  The entire regression will be run once with 
contemporary data for firm characteristics and once for lagged variables to determine 
which variables are most appropriate to use. The list of variables in the Tables below 
illustrate which variables will be run both with current and past data. 
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 Below are two tables giving general descriptions of the variables that will be used 
in the research.  Table I lists the variables and their definitions and the Hypotheses with 
which they will be used.  Table II lists the variable names and predicted correlations with 
the depended and independent variables and where they can be located. 
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Table 1. Variable descriptions and measures 
Variable: Measured: Meaning:  Hypothesis 
Used: 
b0 Intercept General regression intercept H1-H5 
CEOAGE Age of CEO  Age of the CEO on the date of the 
financial distress or hire for new 
CEOs 
H1-H5 
CEOTEN Tenure of CEO at 
present company 
The number of years the CEO has 
been with the company on the 
date of distress 
H1-H3 
CEOEDUC 
Education Level of the 
CEO 
Number of years of education of 
the CEO on the date of financial 
distress and hiring of new CEOs 
H1-H5 
CEOCHR
M 
If the CEO holds the 
positions of both CEO 
and Chairman of the 
Board 
A measure of 1 will mean the 
CEO holds both positions and a 
measure of 0 will mean the CEO 
only holds the CEO position. 
H1-H5 
CEO/ 
FOUNDER 
If the CEO is also the 
founder of the firm 
A measure of 1 will mean the 
CEO is also the founder of the 
firm and a measure of 0 will 
mean he was not the founder of 
the firm. 
H1-H3 
MGTOWN Percentage ownership 
in the firm by the 
CEO. (CEO 
Ownership/ Common 
Outstanding) 
The percentage of ownership in 
the firm by the CEO. 
H1-H5 
INSIDE Whether the new CEO 
was hired from within 
the firm or outside the 
firm. 
The variable will measure a 0 if 
from within the firm and a 1 if the 
new CEO was recruited from 
outside the firm. 
H4-H5 
FORSEG The number of foreign 
segments the firm 
operates in. 
The total number of foreign 
market segments the firm 
operates in. 
H1-H5 
FORREV 
The percentage of 
income generated by 
foreign assets. 
The ratio of income received 
from foreign operations to total 
income. Endogeneity check will 
also be done for this variable 
lagged for 1 year, if needed. 
H1-H5 
FORINC 
The dollar level of 
foreign income. 
The total dollar amount earned 
from foreign revenues from all 
foreign segments, if needed. 
H1-H5 
SIZE The size of the firm as 
measured by sales. 
Firm’s sales measured in dollars 
as of the distress date. 
H1-H5 
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NUMCOU
N 
The number of 
countries within which 
the firm operates. 
The total number of different 
countries within which the firm 
operates. 
H1-H5 
MNE Multinational Status as 
determined by 
Compustat 
The variable will have a 0 for a 
domestic only enterprise and a 1 
for a multinational firm. 
H1-H5 
STKRTN, 
STKRTN t-
1* 
The percentage return 
on the stock. 
The percentage return on the 
stock for the year the firm entered 
distress for H1 and H2 or the 
period during which the new 
CEO is hired for H4 and H5. 
H1-H5 
EPS Earnings Per Share Earnings Per Share for the year 
the firm entered distress for H1 
and H2 or the period during 
which the new CEO is hired for 
H4 and H5. Endogeneity check 
will also be done for this variable 
lagged for 1 year, if needed. 
H1-H5 
MULTISE
G 
Product Diversity The number of different product 
lines the firm operates within.   
H1-H5 
LEVRAT 
Leverage Ratio The leverage ratio for the firm at 
the time of entering distress or 
hiring of the new CEO. This will 
be calculated using the standard 
Debt-to-Equity Formula of  Total 
Debt/Total Equity. 
H1-H5 
BODSZ Board of Directors 
Size 
Simple numerical value for 
number of board of director 
members during the period of 
distress. 
H1-H5* 
ε Error Term Measure of error  H1-H5 
* Time and Data Restrictions permitting. 
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Table 2: Dependent and Independent Variable Correlation Prediction and Location 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Set and 
Description Correlation With
Predicted 
Relationship with 
Dep Var (Excluding 
Turnover) 
Predicted 
Relationship with 
Turnover Location
Dependent:
Compensation CEO Characteristics Positive Negative
PerfPay NA NA NA
Turnover CEO Characteristics Positive Negative
Independent:
CEO Characteristics:
Age Positive Positive
Tenure Positive Negative
Education Positive Neutral
Founder Positive Negative
Chairman Positive Negative
Insider Positive N/A
Firms Characteristics:
Multiseg
Sales/ Emp/ For 
Seg/ ForInc/ 
ForRev Positive Negative
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Sales Employees Positive Negative
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Employees Sales Positive Negative
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Levage Ratio Debt Positive Negative
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
EPS Sales, Stk Rtn Negative Positive
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Mangerial Ownership
CEOTen, 
CEOChrm/ CEO 
Founder Positive Negative
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Foreign Segments
Other Foreign 
Variables Positive Negative
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Foreign Income
Other Foreign 
Variables Positive Negative
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Foreign Revenue
Other Foreign 
Variables Positive Negative
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Number of Countries
Other Foreign 
Variables Positive Negative
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Stock Return Sales/ EPS Positive Negative
Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P
Age/Tenure / 
Education 
/Chairman/ Insider
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P/ 
Lexis/ Nexis
Compustat/ Mergent/ 
Forbes/CRSP/S&P/ 
Lexis/ Nexis
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CHAPTER IV 
 
ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
 
 The scope of the empirical findings of this study was firms in distress from the 
years of 2003–2008. For the purpose of this research, a firm is considered in financial 
distress if it has reported four or more quarters of negative earnings after taxes, within an 
eight-quarter period, following twelve consecutive profitable quarters (Iqbal and French, 
2007).  
 
Data 
Compustat was used to identify the firms in distress during this time period.  
From the population of firms identified, only firms actively members of the S&P 1500 
were used due to data restrictions on Execucomp. Firms were removed from the sample if 
they were not longer viable or had been absorbed by another firm. The full population 
size of distressed firms during the years of 2003-2008, after removing duplicates, was 
797.  After further limiting the firms to active members of the S&P 1500, the final sample 
was 94 firms.  Forty-nine of these firms were designated MNCs, based on multiple 
foreign segments. For the purposes of segmentation, if a firm had greater than zero 
foreign segments, they were determined to be multinational organizations. Table 3 below 
summarizes the descriptive statistics on the final sample. 
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Correlations were completed on each dependent and independent variable (See 
Table 4 below).  There were some predicted correlations like with the four international 
measures.  As a result, two of the measures were run separately to determine which 
international measure produced a greater impact. Foreign Segments was chosen as the 
measure of international depth.  Although, ultimately, the foreign segments variable was 
only used as a separating variable for defining MNC and domestic groups. 
 Forty-five of these firms were domestic. Segmentation data was retrieved from 
Standard and Poors Value-Line Reports and Mergent Online Database.  CEO variable 
data was retrieved from Execucomp Annual Compensation Data. For segmentation 
purposes, a firm was deemed domestic if the number of foreign segments was below one. 
Of the firms that reported a turnover during the time period studied, thirty-seven 
firms experienced turnover in the CEO position. The new CEO data was also retrieved 
from the Execucomp Annual Compensation Data Set in 2003-2008. The results yielded a 
39.78 percentage turnover rate overall.  This is consistent with past research on turnover 
(Gilson, 1991).  When the researcher examined CEO turnover in domestic and 
multinational firms separately, the results were more enlightening.  Domestic firms only 
turned over at the rate of 26.66% while multinational firms turned over at the rate of 
51.02%.  This difference will be examined more closely in the test of means differences 
below. 
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Test of Means Differences 
 In order to determine whether the means of the MNCs and domestic firms were 
different, a test of means was examined. The results were mixed.  Several of the 
dependent variables showed a significant difference.   
TDC2 (results below in Table 5) was the second variable examined for a 
difference.  The test of equality of variances was significant at the .050 level of 
significance with a significance level of 0.  The test for equality of means is  not 
significant at the level of .05.  Domestic firms’ mean was 5431.98 and multinational 
firms’ mean was 3619.05. This does not allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the means are equal.  Therefore, for the TDC2 compensation measure only, compensation 
is not different between the two groups. The rest of the remaining t-tests are shown below 
in Table 5.  
 The means tests suggest that the hypothesis within the test of means equality, 
which is assumed within the statistical software, cannot be rejected for TDC2 when 
applied to incumbent CEOs due to the significance levels of these two means tests.  This 
supports the original hypotheses, that there is a difference between the two groups, and 
confirms that we cannot say that they are in anyway equal.  The repercussions of these 
results will be discussed in the final analysis. 
Table 5 also shows the results of the means tests for PERFPAY of incumbent 
CEOs of multinational and domestic corporations.  The test for equality of variances is 
not significant by a any level of significance with a result of .490. And the t-test for 
equality of means is not significant at any reasonable level of alpha with a two-tailed 
significance level of .641.  This does not allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis. 
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The test fails to reject that the means are equal. Therefore there is no significant 
difference between the compensation, as measured by PERFPAY, of the incumbent 
CEOs of domestic and multinational firms. 
Table 5 also shows the results of the means tests for all the independent variables.  
These results were interesting with several that were significant. 
Table 6 below shows the descriptive statistics for the new, or replacing CEOs of 
both domestic and multinational CEOs.  With a sample size of 37, this number is small 
and a further larger sample is needed to draw a better picture of the replacing CEOs of 
distressed firms. But this sample, consisted of 12 domestic firms and 25 multinational 
firms.  
Table 7, seen below, shows the correlation matrix of the new CEOs variables. The 
same correlations that were present in the old CEOs variables were also seen in the new 
CEOs. 
Table 8 (below) shows the results of the means tests for TDC2 received by the 
CEOs of the new, or replacing, CEOs. The test for equality of variances is not significant 
at a .10 level of significance with a significance level of 0.645.  The t-test for equality of 
means is not significant at any reasonable level of alpha with a two-tailed significance 
level of .552.  This does not allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis. Therefore there 
is no significant difference between the compensation, as measured by TDC2 of the new 
CEOs of domestic and multinational firms. 
Table 8, seen below, also shows the results of the means tests for PERFPAY, or 
perks received by the CEOs of the new, or replacing, CEOs. The test for equality of 
variances is not significant at a .10 level of significance with a significance level of 
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0.831.  The t-test for equality of means is not significant at any reasonable level of alpha 
with a two-tailed significance level of .779.  This does not allow for the rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Therefore there is no significant difference between the compensation, as 
measured by PERFPAY, of the new CEOs of domestic and multinational firms. 
A further means test was also run on the all of the independent variables.  There 
were several independent variables that showed significant differences.  Some of these 
were not unexpected.  Most of the foreign variables were significantly different.  Foreign 
Income, Foreign Revenue and Number of Countries were all significantly different at the 
.001 level. Since the domestic firms had no revenues from foreign sources, this is not 
surprising but one significant difference, that was surprising was the leverage ratios.  
Domestic firms’ leverage ratios were more than double the multinational firm’s leverage 
ratio and significant at the .05 level.  It would seem that foreign firms in distress are not 
as leveraged as domestic firms. 
 To further understand the different variables that impact the levels of 
compensation of multinational and domestic distressed firms, regressions were run on all 
independent variables on each of the dependent variables and the results are shown 
below. 
 
Regression 
Before all regressions were run, test of the robustness of the variables were run to 
determine which independent variables were most appropriate to use and would have the 
least correlation produced.  Correlation tests were run on each of the variables and the 
most significant correlation was found among the international variables. The final 
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variable set was determined to include: CEOAGE, CEOTEN, CEOEDUC, 
CEOFOUNDER, CEO/CHRM, MGTOWN, FORINC, SIZE, STKRTN, EPS, 
MULTISEG, BODSZ, BODOUT and LEVRAT.  Although FORSEG was used as a 
defining variable for identifying multi-nationality, it was only used as an independent 
variable in the logistical regression for all firms. Each of the foreign income variables 
was used independently in each regression to determine whether one had a stronger 
impact on compensation or turnover. It was used in logistical regression model where 
each variable was ultimately tested in the model. Where greater than or equal to one was 
determined to be multinational and less than was identified as domestic. One additional 
variable was used on some of the regressions to determine the impact of the impact of the 
percentage of foreign revenues as a part of total revenue. This variable was labeled 
FORREV and yielded interesting results on the foreign companies in the new CEO 
analysis. The following tables illustrate the regression models used to identify significant 
variables impacting CEO pay and turnover.  Since the hypotheses are based on the 
differences between domestic and multinational, the tables are divided by domestic and 
multinational status.  
 
Incumbent CEOs Regression Analysis 
 
Table 9 below shows Foreign Income’s impact on all three groups of incumbent 
CEOs firms.  The results for these groups were interesting. Both the domestic and 
combined groups yielded a significant model.  The domestic model .093 – significant at 
the .1 level – only yielded one significant variable, management ownership (MGTOWN).  
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CEOs of domestic distressed firms salaries are highly impacted by their share of 
managerial ownership.  The combined group, which included both domestic and 
multinational firm’s was significant at the .001 level.  This model is an excellent 
predictor of the salaries of CEOs of distressed firms and included three highly significant 
independent variables: managerial ownership (MGTOWN), size (SIZE) and board size 
(BODSZ).  These three variables were significant at the .018, .009 and .012 levels.  
Showing that managerial ownership, firm size and board size all significantly impact 
salary as measured by TDC2 for distressed firms. 
The next model to be examined was the same model but the regression was 
repeated until a significant model was achieved for both domestic and multinational 
firms.  This is shown in Table 10 below.  With the regression software allowed to remove 
variables, a more accurate model is produced.  With a significance of .038 (Domestic) 
and .040 (Multinational), the results show which variables are more impactful to each 
group. Managerial ownership (.037) and size (.089) remained significant variables for the 
domestic firms, yet they were not significant for the multinational firms.  CEO founder 
status (.050) and board size (.003) were significant for multinational firms only.  The 
separation of the firms allows insight into which variables impact the different groups 
more significantly when determining salary. 
The next model to be run included the same three groups (Domestic, 
Multinational and Combined) for the Foreign Revenue variable.  This variable shows 
more clearly how large the percentage of the foreign revenue is of total revenue.  In Table 
11 below, the results are shown. 
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 Significant models were once again present for domestic and the combined 
groups.  The domestic group was significant at the .093 level and the combined group 
was significant at the .001 level.  These models are excellent predictors of salaries and 
the impacting firm variables.  The same variables were again significant for each group 
(managerial ownership and size).  No matter the foreign variable utilized for impact, the 
same variables are shown to impact the salaries of CEOs of distressed firms. 
The final TDC2 model examined for incumbent CEOs was the model that allowed 
for all the non-impacting variables to be removed to allow for a significant model of 
salary determination. In Table 12 below, all three groups are run until a significant model 
emerges.  Similar results are found, with managerial ownership (.037) and size (.087) 
impacting the domestic firms and board size impacting the multinational firms (.004).  
An equally interesting note was that the variables that were removed to attain the 
significant model.  Foreign income, multiple segments and leverage ration were removed 
to attain a better domestic model.  And the CEOs age, chairman status, foreign variable, 
past stock returns and number of segments were removed for the multinational firms.  It 
would seem that number of segments do not impact salary, in this sample, as previous 
research had indicated (Rose and Shepard, 1990). 
  Surprisingly very few variables had to be removed to attain a significant model.  
This process was necessary to see which independent variables do not impact the 
determination of salaries.  This process also shows what variables affected domestic 
firms versus what impacted multinational firms, which was one of the goals of this paper.  
The most surprising removal for domestic firms was the absence of leverage ratio and the 
number of segments.  For this sample of distressed domestic firms, these two variables 
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are best left out of the model.  For the multinational model, the removal of both foreign 
revenue and number of segments was most surprising.  This leads to the conclusion that 
the ratio of foreign revenue to total revenue has little impact on the salary of the CEO.  
This refutes the idea that the complexity of the position is rewarded with greater pay.  Yet 
board size was significant with both multinational and all CEOs combined.  This should 
lead to more research on the board’s involvement in foreign firms.  This group ultimately 
had greater turnover – almost double the domestic group. 
The final 4 models were run in the same method but for the Performance 
Variable.  The results are seen below in Tables 13 through 16 below.   There were no 
significant results from any of the models using the foreign variable Foreign Income, but 
each result will be discussed below. 
The lack of results on these four groups of regressions leads to no meaningful 
conclusions about performance pay received by CEOs of firms in distress – either 
domestic or multinational.  One consistent revelation about the group was that less than 
1% of the firms paid out bonuses to the CEOs during the distressed time.  
After examining these results, several thoughts come from this lack of results: (1) 
other variables would be more appropriate in measuring impact on performance pay; or 
(2) distressed firms do not reward CEOs with performance pay after four successive 
quarters of negative Earning Per Share.  Both of these thoughts should be examined in 
future research. 
Now that the incumbent CEO results have been examined, it is time to look at the 
replacement CEO results. 
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Replacement CEO Regression Analysis 
 
 With turnover rates of slightly over 50% for the multinational firms, expectations 
were that these groups of individuals would yield interesting results.  With the smaller 
size of the domestic turnovers, fewer significant results were expected. 
 The first model with all variables plugged into the model and no exclusions made 
(one exception for CEOED for the domestic due to the problem of all of the CEOs have a 
Masters and the regression excluded the variable) yielded no significant models of 
predictive power. 
 
 When attempting to find the significant model, the multinational model yielded 
the best results.  Only when the age of the CEO, the education level of the CEO, number 
of segments and board size variables were removed was a strong model seen at the .046 
level of significance.  This is not surprising because all of the CEOs had a masters level 
of education, except one with a doctorate, thus making this variable almost unnecessary. 
All three groupings were affected by the previous year’s stock return, which was 
surprising since they were not in office at this point. 
 Once again, when the model was run with all the variables, the foreign revenue 
models yielded no significant results.  One problem variable was the founder variable.  
Only one multinational firm had a returning founder replace the incumbent CEO. This 
skewed the results for this variable throughout the model (Table 19).   
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 When the regression software was allowed to remove independent variables to 
find a significant model, a few more insights were gained.  As seen in Table 20, very few 
of the same variables affected both groups.  Only board size was significant in each 
model.  And the only common variable between the groups included: size, number of 
segments, leverage ratio and board size. Thus showing that an attempt to put these 
groups, domestic firms and multinational distressed firms, into one group, is extremely 
challenging.  These groups obviously respond to distress and CEO rewards in very 
different ways.  A better method of future study would be to have two large separate 
groups and study them with exactly the same variables in periods of firm prosperity and 
distress.  Similar results were seen for the group with the foreign revenue variable 
(Tables 19-20). 
When performance variables (Tables 21- 24) were examined for the new CEOs, 
one surprising result came through.  The first regression run on the models, with foreign 
income as the foreign identifying variable, yielded a strong result for the domestic and 
multinational firms at the .009 and .022 levels.  (Similar results were seen for the foreign 
revenue models also.) Yet when all firms were placed together in one model, no 
significant results were gained.  One problem was that none of the domestic firms had 
any foreign segments or revenues at all.  And this variable was kicked out of the 
regression on domestic models.  Nor did domestic CEOs have any significant managerial 
ownership with levels below .01%.  But several variables strongly affected both groups 
including:  Insider/Outsider status of the new CEO, previous stock return, number of 
segments, leverage ratio and board size all played important roles in the compensation of 
these newly appointed CEOs and should be examined with a larger sample size.  It would 
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seem that accurate predictor models can be achieved on each group when separated but 
not when placed together.  Once again, this illustrates that the differences between 
domestic firms and multinational firms might be too great to be measured as a whole. 
 
Logistical Regression on Turnover 
 
 With turnover rates of 26.6 % for domestic firms and 51.02 % for multinational 
firms, further research is needed to see what variables impacted turnover among these 
groups.  Therefore, a logistical regression analysis was completed to determine if multi-
nationality impacted the turnover of the CEO in a firm that was in distress. The model 
was designed with logistical values of 0 for no turnover and 1 for turnover.  In the 
logistical regression the first model used foreign income (measured in dollars) and 
measured it against each group separately, with all groups placed together and then with 
the groups separated.  The results are seen in Tables 25 and 26 below. 
 The domestic group and the combined group yielded significant results at the .028 
and .019 levels when run with the foreign income independent variable.  These models 
also gave a predictive accuracy of 86.7 and 67.1 percent respectively.  While the general 
models were good predictors of turnover, very few variables individually were good 
predictors.  The CEOs age and number of foreign segments were the only variables that 
showed any significance individually in predicting turnover.   
 Foreign Revenue produced similar results. Once again the domestic firms 
logistical regression was significant at .028 with the combined firms turnover regression 
significant at the .065 level.  These models also had significant predictive power at 66.7 
and 59.1 percent respectively.  Once again the models were strong predictors of turnover 
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but few individual variables were strong predictors.  The CEOs age was the strongest 
individual variable.  While it has been long known that the age of the CEO is an 
important factor in turnover, this explains little about why distressed firms focused more 
on this than the four consecutive quarters of negative earnings per share.   
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics on Incumbent CEOs for both multinational and domestic 
firms.  
Variable #obs Min 
($000) 
Median 
($000) 
Max ($000) Mean 
($000) 
Std dev 
($000) 
TDC1 94 10.58 1860.20 38237.44 3649.95 5325.92 
TDC2 94 249.60 1462.52 48208.51 4486.94 7823.89 
PERFPAY 
(PERKS) 
94 .01 46.65 5029.45 783.40 321.07 
PERKS 
PERCENT 
94 .00001 .03 .75 .10 .15 
CEOAGE 94 36 56 78 55.83 8.60 
CEOTEN 94 0 7 41 9.86 9.52 
MGTOWN 94 0 224.89 18048.02 1089.87 2779.54 
FORSEG 94 0 1 11 1.48 1.99 
FORREV (%) 94 0 .0537 .9327 .2220 .2842 
FORINC ($) 94 0 15918 388403000 956966 46169161 
SIZE 
(Employees) 
94 159 3130.5 387000 10081.88 40810.67 
STKRTN (%) 94 -.8677 -.0407 2.8632 .0939 .6734 
STKRTN t-1  94 -19.88 -.3729 2.86 -.4869 2.079 
EPS ($) 94 -18.33 -.725 4.42 -2.68 4.689 
MULTISEG 94 1 3 6 2.95 1.21 
LEVRAT 94 0 .625 23.65 1.22 2.72 
BODSZ 94 5 9 17 9.202 2.47 
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Table 4:  Correlations of Dependent and Independent Variables of Incumbent CEOs. 
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Table 5. Tests of Mean Differences of Incumbent CEOs 
 Domestic  MNC     
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Diff- 
erence 
t-stat Sig. 
 
TDC2 
(incumbent) 
 
5431.98 9089.05 3619.05 6424.00 1812.93 1.12 .271 
 
PERFPAY 
(incumbent) 
 
.10313 .16633 .08836 .13644 .0148 -.472 .641 
CEOAGE 57.76 8.051 54.06 8.747 -3.69 2.125 .036** 
CEOTEN 11.53 10.750 8.32 8.045 1.65 -3.217 .10* 
BA/BS .56 .503 .49 .505 -.632 -.066 .529 
Master .22 .420 .37 .487 1.54 .145 .127 
Doctoral .22 .420 .14 .354 -.993 -.079 .323 
CEO/CHR
M 
.71 .458 .61 .492 1.005 -.099 .317 
CEO 
FOUNDER 
.27 .447 .22 .422 -.471 -.042 .639 
MGTOWN 1665.99 3867.18 560.79 814.27 1.955 1105.2 .054* 
FORINC 4842.22 32482.18 18353670 62971607 1.95 18348828 .054* 
FORREV .01 .037 .42 .266 10.36 .415 .000*** 
NUMCOU
N 
1.6 5.071 15.18 15.052 5.05 12.025 .000*** 
EMP 12916.62 57249.16 7478.55 14426.72 -.643 5438.07 .522 
STKRTN .0281 .7405 .2054 .5911 1.70 .1376 .093* 
STKRTN t-1 -.3469 .3532 -.6154 2.868 -.623 .2685 .535 
EPS -4.55 5.33 -.9678 3.2057 3.98 3.58 .000*** 
MULTISE
G 
2.98 1.454 2.94 .944 -.155 -.039 .877 
LEVRAT 1.9915 3.766 .5209 .5545 2.70 1.471 .008** 
BODSZ 9.44 2.201 8.98 2.696 -.911 .465 .365 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables New CEOs for both multinational and domestic 
firms.  
Variable #obs Min 
($000) 
Median 
($000) 
Max ($000) Mean 
($000) 
Std dev 
($000) 
TDC2 37 17.06 1769.60 10307.21 2980.38 2663.84 
PERFPAY 
(PERKS) 
37 3.958 33.68 533.15 98.34 140.58 
PERKS 
PERCENT 
37 .2 1.9 82.8 8.97 16.46 
CEOAGE 37 31 51 62 49.97 7.21 
CEOTEN 37 0 0 1 .08 .27 
MGTOWN 37 .279 108.41 3755.73 493.03 889.55 
FORSEG 37 0 2 7 2.57 2.36 
FORREV (%) 37      
FORINC ($) 37 0 276300 16591522 1243817 3195577 
SIZE 
(Employees) 
37 409 4193 35472 6174.05 6607.85 
STKRTN (%) 37 -67.57 10.74 251.02 21.48 64.15 
STKRTN t-1  37 -87.5 -6.85 95.74 -9.20 45.06 
EPS ($) 37 -13.85 .23 4.21 -.23 3.18 
MULTISEG 37 1 3 6 2.84 .986 
LEVRAT 37 0 .41 4.15 .771 .872 
BODSZ 37 5 10 21 9.81 2.95 
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Table 7. Correlation 
Correlation coefficients and significances for all independent and dependent 
variables of New CEOs. 
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Table 8. Tests of Mean Differences of New (Succeeding) CEOs  
 DC  MNC     
 Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Diff- 
erence 
t-stat Sig. 
TDC2  
(succeeding) 
 
3387.93 3127.15 2807.95 2490.51 579.98 -.600 .552 
PERFPAY 
(succeeding) 
 
.07784 .1194 .0948 .1824 .01699 .518 .779 
CEOAGE 51.91 8.871 49.15 6.404 -2.755 1.065 .294 
CEOTEN .00 .000 .12 .326 .115 1.165 .252 
CEOED .73 .467 .69 .471 -.035 .671 .837 
CEO/CHRM .36 .505 .15 .368 -.210 1.417 .165 
CEO 
FOUNDER 
.09 .302 .08 .272 -.014 -.139 .891 
MGTOWN 1.206 3.944 .8065 1.77 .399 .177 .670 
FORINC 00 00 1.206 3.94 1770046 1.57 .022** 
FORREV .00 .00 .4438 .2730 .4438 5.34 .000*** 
NUMCOUN 1.00 0 16.65 12.868 15.654 4.002 .000*** 
EMP 4796.45 5916.40 6756.88 6905.50 1960.43 .821 .391 
STKRTN .2922 .7060 .182 .6239 .1102 -.473 .639 
STKRTN t-1 -.2622 .3809 -.0200 .4650 .137 .2421 .112 
EPS -.8209 3.331 .0181 30.148 .839 .712 .486 
MULTISEG 3.09 1.446 2.73 .724 -.360 1.016 .317 
LEVRAT 1.24 1.15 .5691 .6495 .679 2.29 .028** 
BODSZ 9.55 1.916 9.92 3.22 .378 .351 .668 
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Table 9. Regressions of Total Pay Difference between DC and MNC Before Turnover 
with Foreign Income as Foreign Identification 
 TDC2 before 
DOM 
TDC2 before MNC TDC2 before Combined 
CEOAGE -163.990 
(.461) 
-1.980 
(.988) 
-10.732 
(.920) 
CEOTEN 211.559 
(.434.) 
134.250 
(.676) 
135.147 
(.413) 
BS/BA 
- 5904.539 
(.452) 
386.615 
(.955) 
MS/MA 
2610.634 
(.453) 
6405.099 
(.433) 
1404.731 
(.841) 
Doctoral 
-1590.826 
(.664) 
 
7390.173 
(.334) 
1620.856 
(.819) 
 
CEOCHRM 
 
-3937.596 
(.277) 
1013.259 
(.665) 
-888.504 
(.632) 
CEO/ FOUNDER 
-2990.640 
(.488) 
4739.831 
(.292) 
-405.445 
(.871) 
MGTOWN 
 
1.146 
(.045)** 
-1.433 
(.615) 
.917 
(.018)** 
FORINC  
 
-.015 
(.727) 
-.000016 
(.324) 
.000000797 
(.631) 
FORSEG 
 
- - -295.085 
(.461) 
SIZE 
 
.046 
(.101) 
.090 
(.299) 
.051 
(.009)** 
STKRTN  
 
677.784 
(.769) 
-1408.595 
(.463) 
100.801 
(.936) 
STKRTN t-1 
 
-2147.598 
(.616) 
70.557 
(.881) 
-11.367 
(.981) 
EPS  
 
-59.587 
(.853) 
415.760 
(.217) 
107.295 
(.571) 
MULTISEG 
 
167.391 
(.882) 
-254.553 
(.847) 
281.079 
(.673) 
LEVRAT 
46.238 
(.917) 
-2542.187 
(.195) 
-178.597 
(.545) 
BODSZ 
809.417 
(.375) 
1151.373 
(.011)** 
911.042 
(.012)** 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 45 49 94 
F 1.763 1.234 2.753 
P-value .093* .297 .001*** 
R2 .477 .382 .381 
Adj R2 .206 .072 .243 
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Table 10. Regressions of Total Pay Difference between DC and MNC Before Turnover 
with Foreign Income as Foreign Variable– Final Significant Model 
 
 TDC2 before DOM TDC2 before MNC TDC2 before Combined 
CEOAGE 
 
-172.906 
(.405) 
- -10.732 
(.920) 
CEOTEN 
 
210.091 
(.421) 
- 135.147 
(.413) 
BS/BA 
- 2943.685 
(.507) 
386.615 
(.955) 
MS/MA 
2709.607 
(.415) 
3500.647 
(.446) 
1404.731 
(.841) 
Doctoral 
-1608.353 
(.632) 
4748.706 
(.333) 
1620.856 
(.819) 
CEOCHRM 
 
-4013.232 
(.227) 
- -888.504 
(.632) 
CEO/ FOUNDER 
-2829.729 
(.483) 
4741.007 
(.050)** 
-405.445 
(.871) 
MGTOWN 
 
1.150 
(.037)** 
- .917 
(.018)** 
FORINC  
 
-.017 
(.681) 
.0000153 
(.291) 
.000000797 
(.631) 
FORREV 
 
- - -295.085 
(.461) 
SIZE 
 
.045 
(.089)* 
.068 
(.304) 
.051 
(.009)** 
STKRTN  
 
656.029 
(.757) 
-1018.387 
(.508) 
100.801 
(.936) 
STKRTN t-1 
 
-2346.848 
(.556) 
- -11.367 
(.981) 
EPS  
 
-74.633 
(.787) 
455.888 
(.124) 
107.295 
(.571) 
MULTISEG 
 
- - 281.079 
(.673) 
LEVRAT 
- -2386.558 
(.178) 
-178.597 
(.545) 
BODSZ 
889.556 
(.229) 
1156.118 
(.003)** 
911.042 
(.012)** 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 45 49 94 
F 2.169 2.196 2.753 
P-value .038** .040** .001*** 
R2 .476 .366 .381 
Adj R2 .257 .199 .243 
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Table 11. Regressions of Total Pay Difference between DC and MNC Before Turnover 
with Foreign Revenue as Foreign Variable 
 
 TDC2 before DOM TDC2 before MNC TDC2 before 
Combined 
CEOAGE 
 
-163.990 
(.461) 
-23.859 
(.881) 
-31.367 
(.772) 
CEOTEN 
 
211.559 
(.434) 
175.204 
(.597) 
170.809 
(.297) 
BS/BA 
- 5238.707 
(.565) 
-430.493 
(.950) 
MS/MA 
2610.634 
(.453) 
5074.951 
(.596) 
339.908 
(.961) 
Doctoral 
-1590.826 
(.664) 
6361.462 
(.486) 
473.496 
(.947) 
CEOCHRM 
 
-3937.596 
(.277) 
641.406 
(.806) 
-1381.525 
(.465) 
CEO/ FOUNDER 
-2990.640 
(.488) 
4146.693 
(.371) 
-746.630 
(.764) 
MGTOWN 
 
1.146 
(.045)** 
-1.509 
(.631) 
.919 
(.017)** 
FORSEG 
 
- - -799.711 
(.190) 
FORREV (%) 
 
-13167.707 
(.727) 
825.813 
(.886) 
4739.258 
(.287) 
SIZE 
 
.046 
(.101) 
.087 
(.339) 
.050 
(.012)** 
STKRTN  
 
677.784 
(.769) 
-1301.049 
(.511) 
64.886 
(.959) 
STKRTN t-1 
 
-2147.598 
(.616) 
102.607 
(.834) 
44.785 
(.925) 
EPS  
 
-59.87 
(.853) 
392.023 
(.257) 
72.577 
(.701) 
MULTISEG 
 
167.391 
(.882) 
-159.122 
(.914) 
201.477 
(.762) 
LEVRAT 
46238 
(.917) 
-2222.651 
(.258) 
-155.846 
(.594) 
BODSZ 
809.417 
(.375) 
1181.063 
(.015)** 
1001.890 
(.007)** 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 45 49 94 
F 1.763 1.138 2.840 
P-value .093* .365 .001*** 
R2 .477 .363 .388 
Adj R2 .206 .044 .252 
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Table 12. Regressions of Total Pay Difference between DC and MNC Before Turnover 
with Foreign Revenue as Foreign Variable – Final Significant Model at .05** 
Level 
 
 TDC2 before 
DOM 
TDC2 before MNC TDC2 before Combined 
CEOAGE 
 
-172.906 
(.405) 
- -31.367 
(.772) 
CEOTEN 
 
310.091 
(.421) 
194.317 
(.456) 
170.809 
(.297) 
BS/BA 
- 4260.884 
(.426) 
-430.493 
(.950) 
MS/MA 
2709.607 
(.415) 
4307.885 
(.432) 
339.908 
(.961) 
Doctoral 
-1608.353 
(.632) 
5357.191 
(.325) 
473.496 
(.947) 
CEOCHRM 
 
-4013.232 
(.227) 
- -1381.525 
(.465) 
CEO/ FOUNDER 
-2829.729 
(.483) 
4126.063 
(.263) 
-746.630 
(.764) 
MGTOWN 
 
1.150 
(.037)** 
-1.547 
(.527) 
.919 
(.017)** 
FORINC  
 
- - - 
FORREV (%) 
 
-14584.786 
(.681) 
- 4739.258 
(.287) 
SIZE .045 
(.089)* 
.091 
(.215) 
.050 
(.012)** 
STKRTN  
 
656.029 
(.757) 
-1145.041 
(.517) 
64.886 
(.959) 
STKRTN t-1 
 
-2346.848 
(.556) 
- 44.785 
(.925) 
EPS  
 
-74.633 
(.787) 
379.683 
(.222) 
72.577 
(.701) 
MULTISEG 
 
- - 201.477 
(.762) 
LEVRAT 
- -2115.023 
(.233) 
-155.846 
(.594) 
BODSZ 
889.556 
(.229) 
1185.023 
(.004)** 
1001.890 
(.007)** 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 45 49 94 
F 2.169 2.304 93 
P-value .038** .035** 2.840 
R2 .476 .347 .001*** 
Adj R2 .257 .196 .388 
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Table 13:  Regressions of Performance Pay of Incumbent CEOs Difference between DC 
and MNC Before Turnover with Foreign Income as Foreign Variable 
 
 PERFPAY before - 
DOM 
PERFPAY before- 
MNC 
 
PERFPAY – before 
Combined 
CEOAGE .005 
(.248) 
.000 
(.968) 
.003 
(.278) 
CEOTEN .000 
(.939) 
.011 
(.133) 
.004 
(.308) 
BS/BA 
- .163 
(.373) 
.094 
(.543) 
MS/MA 
-.003 
(.964) 
.129 
(.498) 
.067 
(.670) 
Doctoral 
-.074 
(.318) 
.141 
(.428) 
.058 
(.714) 
CEOCHRM -.091 
(.214) 
.017 
(.756) 
-.011 
(.783) 
CEOFOUNDER 
-.101 
(.249) 
-.148 
(.159) 
.083 
(.141) 
MGTOWN .000000615 
(.956) 
-.0000397 
(.549) 
.00000946 
(.270) 
FORINC -.0000002 
(.778) 
.000000000054 
(.885) 
-.0000000000387 
(.917) 
FORSEG - - .003 
(.760) 
SIZE .00000000670 
(.990) 
.00000125 
(.534) 
.00000008717 
(.841) 
STKRTN  .025 
(.596) 
.031 
(.493) 
.035 
(.215) 
STKRTN t-1 -.106 
(.226) 
.008 
(.446) 
.008 
(.482) 
EPS -.008 
(.213) 
.002 
(.776) 
-.008 
(.075)* 
MULTISEG -.018 
(.430) 
-.043 
(.172) 
-.015 
(.312) 
LEVRAT 
.001 
(.948) 
.030 
(.513) 
-.003 
(.608) 
BODSZ 
-.018 
(.324) 
.008 
(.885) 
.000 
(.974) 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 45 49 94 
F 1.095 .690 .854 
P-value .402 .782 .628 
R2 .362 .257 .160 
Adj R2 .031 -.115 -.027 
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Table 14:  Regressions of Performance Pay of Incumbent CEOs Difference between DC 
and MNC Before Turnover with Foreign Income as Foreign Variable – 
Significant Model at the .05 Level 
 
 PERFPAY before 
- DOM 
PERFPAY 
before- MNC 
 
PERFPAY – before 
Combined 
CEOAGE .071 
(.732) 
- .004 
(.024) 
CEOTEN - .007 
(.082)* 
- 
BS/BA 
- - - 
MS/MA 
- - - 
Doctoral 
-.072 
(.253) 
- - 
CEOCHRM -.094 
(.095)* 
- - 
CEOFOUNDER 
-.104 
(.098)* 
-.128 
(.082)* 
-.067 
(.061)* 
MGTOWN - - - 
FORINC - - - 
FORSEG - - - 
SIZE - - - 
STKRTN  .021 
(.554) 
- .032 
(.186) 
STKRTN t-1 -.108 
(.148) 
- - 
EPS -.008 
(.140) 
- -.005 
(.152) 
MULTISEG -.017 
(.391) 
-.038 
(.079)* 
 
LEVRAT 
-   
BODSZ 
-.018 
(.130 
  
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 45 49 94 
F 2.181 1.867 2.670 
P-value .048** .149 .037** 
R2 .359 .111 .107 
Adj R2 .195 .051 .067 
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Table 15:  Regressions of Performance Pay of Incumbent CEOs Difference between DC 
and MNC Before Turnover with Foreign Revenue as Foreign Variable  
 
 
 PERFPAY before 
DOM 
PERFPAY before 
MNC 
 
PERFPAY – before 
Combined 
CEOAGE .005 
(.248) 
.000 
(.891) 
.003 
(.290) 
CEOTEN .000 
(.939) 
.011 
(.143) 
.004 
(.296) 
BS/BA 
- .146 
(.485) 
.093 
(.550) 
MS/MA 
-.003 
(.964) 
.108 
(.523) 
.065 
(.681) 
Doctoral 
-.074 
(.318) 
.121 
(.562) 
.056 
(.681) 
CEOCHRM -.091 
(.214) 
.012 
(.842) 
-.012 
(.774) 
CEOFOUNDER 
-.101 
(.249) 
-.154 
(.153) 
-.084 
(.137) 
MGTOWN .000000615 
(.956) 
-.0000358 
(.619) 
-.00000951 
(.266) 
FORREV -.214 
(.778) 
.022 
(.867) 
.006 
(.956) 
FORSEG - - .002 
(.878) 
SIZE .00000000698 
(.990) 
.00000116 
(.579) 
.0000000857 
(.844) 
STKRTN  .025 
(.596) 
.030 
(.512) 
.035 
(.211) 
STKRTN t-1 -.106 
(.226) 
.008 
(.470) 
.008 
(.469) 
EPS -.008 
(.213) 
.002 
(.765) 
-.008 
(.074)* 
MULTISEG -.018 
(.430) 
-.044 
(.193) 
-.015 
(.316) 
LEVRAT 
.001 
(.948) 
.031 
(.488) 
-.003 
(.615) 
BODSZ 
-.018 
(.324) 
.009 
(.412) 
.000 
(.956) 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 45 49 94 
F 1.095 .691 .853 
P-value .402 .782 .629 
R2 .362 .257 .160 
Adj R2 .031 -.115 -.028 
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Table 16. Regressions of Performance Pay of Incumbent CEOs Difference between  
     DC and MNC Before Turnover with Foreign Revenue as Foreign Variable  
                – Significant Model at the .05 Level 
 
 TDC2 before 
DOM 
TDC2 before MNC TDC2 before Combined 
CEOAGE 
 
.005 
(.122) 
- .004 
(.024)** 
CEOTEN 
 
- .008 
(.040)** 
- 
BS/BA 
- - - 
MS/MA 
- - - 
Doctoral 
-.072 
(.253) 
- - 
CEOCHRM 
 
-.094 
(.095)* 
- - 
CEO/ FOUNDER 
-.104 
(.098)* 
-.147 
(.053)* 
-.067 
(.061)* 
MGTOWN 
 
- - - 
FORINC  
 
- - - 
FORSEG 
 
- - - 
SIZE 
 
- - - 
STKRTN  
 
.021 
(.554) 
.052 
(.138) 
.032 
(.186) 
STKRTN t-1 
 
-.108 
(.148) 
- - 
EPS  
 
-.008 
(.140) 
- -.005 
(.152) 
MULTISEG 
 
-.017 
(.391) 
-.039 
(.062)* 
 
LEVRAT 
- -  
BODSZ 
-.018 
(.130) 
.010 
(.160) 
 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 45 49 94 
F 2.181 1.946 2.670 
P-value .048** .106 .037** 
R2 .359 .185 .107 
Adj R2 .195 .090 .067 
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Table 17. Regressions of Total Pay Difference between DC and MNC After  
     Turnover with Foreign Income as Foreign Identification 
 
 
 TDC2 after 
Domestic 
TDC2 after MNC TDC2 after Combined 
 
CEOAGE 
-328.18 
(.219) 
-30.787 
(.784) 
8.092 
(.938) 
CEOED 
- 443.07 
(.770) 
-1064.31 
(.640) 
 
CEOCHRM 
-2326.52 
(.176) 
1329.72 
(.576) 
-455.60 
(.762) 
CEO/ FOUNDER 
- .328.128 
(.919) 
-1115.41 
(.444) 
MGTOWN 
 
- -169.023 
(.609) 
489.42 
(.885) 
FORINC  
 
- .000 
(.487) 
.867 
(.392) 
INSIDER/ 
OUTSIDER 
 
-1280.52 
(.362) 
1880.09 
(.183) 
- 
SIZE 
 
- -.165 
(.348) 
-.167 
(.265) 
STKRTN  
 
-3327.79 
(.187) 
462.84 
(.717) 
419.90 
(.708) 
STKRTN t-1 
 
-3349.38 
(.187) 
3287.30 
(.081)* 
1627.11 
(.309) 
EPS  
 
- 303.11 
(.199) 
-17.87 
(.945) 
MULTISEG 
 
165.98 
(.760) 
117.662 
(.895) 
-515.39 
(.415) 
LEVRAT 
1482.097 
(.104) 
729.27 
(.531) 
1202.49 
(.157) 
BODSZ 
769.26 
(.319) 
632.69 
(.042)** 
371.50 
(.217) 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 12 25 37 
F 5.029 1.407 .757 
P-value .176 .297 .711 
R2 .953 .679 .377 
Adj R2 .763 .196 -.121 
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Table 18. Regressions of Total Pay Difference between DC and MNC After Turnover 
with Foreign Income as Foreign Variable– Final Significant Model 
 
 TDC2 after 
Domestic 
TDC2 after 
MNC 
TDC2 after 
Combined 
CEOAGE 
 
-375.68 
(.090)* 
- - 
CEOED 
- - - 
CEOCHRM 
 
-2586.70 
(.062)* 
713.82 
(.619) 
- 
MGTOWN 
 
- .939 
(.092)* 
.758 
(.131) 
FORINC  
 
- .000 
(.417) 
- 
INSIDER/ 
OUTSIDER 
 
- 2049.55 
(.052)* 
- 
SIZE 
 
- -.183 
(.115) 
-.160 
(.048)** 
STKRTN  
 
-3620.54 
(.102) 
713.25 
(.432) 
- 
STKRTN t-1 
 
-3533.64 
(.085)* 
3395.03 
(.013)** 
1823.89 
(.087)* 
EPS  
 
- 295.231 
(.104) 
- 
MULTISEG 
 
- - -416.60 
(.392) 
LEVRAT 
1587.69 
(.030)** 
560.82 
(.458) 
1219.44 
(.027)** 
BODSZ 
828.65 
(.157) 
- 412.48 
(.022)** 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 12 25 37 
F 7.381 2.621 2.413 
P-value .037** .046** .05** 
R2 .917 .673 .571 
Adj R2 .793 .416 .326 
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Table 19. Regressions of Total Pay Difference between DC and MNC After Turnover 
with Foreign Revenue as Foreign Variable 
 
 TDC2 after 
Domestic 
TDC2 after 
MNC 
TDC2 after 
Combined 
CEOAGE 
 
-328.18 
(.219) 
-10.454 
(.928) 
-.952 
(.992) 
CEOED 
- -6.76 
(.996) 
-539.11 
(.701) 
CEOCHRM 
 
-2326.52 
(.176) 
-56.53 
(.982) 
-1254.67 
(.372) 
CEO/ FOUNDER 
- -159.84 
(.960) 
769.31 
(.812) 
MGTOWN 
 
- -218.39 
(.518) 
.905 
(.352) 
INSIDER/ 
OUTSIDER 
 
- 1929.46 
(.175) 
338.52 
(.773) 
FORREV (%) 
 
-1280.52 
(.362) 
1400.71 
(.553) 
2405.03 
(.192) 
SIZE 
 
- -.246 
(.111) 
-.164 
(.203) 
STKRTN  
 
-3327.79 
(.187) 
1027.63 
(.422) 
516.53 
(.625) 
STKRTN t-1 
 
-3349.38 
(.187) 
3400.55 
(.071)* 
1105.83 
(.478) 
EPS  
 
- 242.02 
(.313) 
-37.71 
(.879) 
MULTISEG 
 
165.98 
(.760) 
-254.84 
(.748) 
-375.48 
(.527) 
LEVRAT 
1482.097 
(.104) 
1003.54 
(.379) 
1366.51 
(.094)* 
BODSZ 
769.26 
(.319) 
638.3 
(.041)** 
375.08 
(.191) 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 12 25 37 
F 5.029 1.379 .936 
P-value .176 .309 .548 
R2 .953 .674 .428 
Adj R2 .763 .185 -.029 
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Table 20. Regressions of Total Pay Difference between DC and MNC Before Turnover 
with Foreign Revenue as Foreign Variable – Final Significant Model at .05** 
Level 
 TDC2 after 
Domestic 
TDC2 after 
MNC 
TDC2 after 
Combined 
CEOAGE 
 
-375.68 
(.090)* 
- - 
CEO ED 
-2586.70 
(.062)* 
- - 
CEOCHRM 
 
 - -906.49 
(.349) 
CEO/ FOUNDER 
- - - 
MGTOWN 
 
- .903 
(.102) 
.873 
(.082)* 
INSIDER/ 
OUTSIDER 
 
- 1978.74 
(.065)* 
- 
FORREV (%) 
 
- 1383.12 
(.418) 
2326.02 
(.137) 
SIZE -3620.54 
(.102) 
-.239 
(.031)** 
-.167 
(.037)** 
STKRTN  
 
-3533.64 
(.085)* 
1003.54 
(.189) 
- 
STKRTN t-1 
 
- 3350.95 
(.018)** 
1126.81 
(.307) 
EPS  
 
- 238.74 
(.176) 
- 
MULTISEG 
 
1587.69 
(.030)** 
-261.27 
(.677) 
-312.61 
(.514) 
LEVRAT 
828.65 
(.157) 
937.52 
(.224) 
1423.30 
(.012)** 
BODSZ 
-375.68 
(.090)* 
627.98 
(.011)** 
104.60 
(.023)** 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 12 25 37 
F 7.381 2.627 2.298 
P-value .037** .046** .049** 
R2 .917 .674 .630 
Adj R2 .793 .417 .396 
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Table 21:  Regressions of Performance Pay of New CEOs Difference between DC   
      and MNC After Turnover with Foreign Income as Foreign Variable 
 
 PERFPAY after - 
Domestic 
PERFPAY after- 
MNC 
 
PERFPAY – after 
Combined 
CEOAGE -.001 
(.737) 
-.005 
(.410) 
-.009 
(.133) 
CEOTEN - - .061 
(.640) 
CEOED 
- .108 
(.180) 
.104 
(.236) 
CEOCHRM .162 
(.003)** 
.176 
(.163) 
.037 
(.658) 
CEO FOUNDER - .654 
(.002)** 
.264 
(.264) 
INSIDER/ 
OUTSIDER 
-.083 
(.012)** 
.151 
(.047)* 
.071 
(.316) 
MGTOWN - .000 
(.018)** 
-.00006647 
(.255) 
FORINC - -.00000002 
(.082)* 
-.00000000614 
(.616) 
SIZE - -.0000353 
(.002)** 
-.0000095 
(.266) 
STKRTN  .034 
(.162) 
-.189 
(.013)** 
-.097 
(.142) 
STKRTN t-1 .180 
(.006)** 
-.423 
(.013)** 
-.186 
               (.05)** 
EPS - -.015 
(.217) 
-.005 
(.719) 
MULTISEG -.013 
(.077)* 
.097 
(.054)* 
.035 
(.339) 
LEVRAT 
.032 
(.018)** 
-.105 
(.097)* 
-.020 
(.667) 
BODSZ 
-.018 
(.066)* 
-.039 
(.047)** 
-.008 
(.623) 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 12 25 37 
F 110.79 3.634 1.093 
P-value .009** .022** .419 
R2 .998 .845 .467 
Adj R2 .989 .612 .040 
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Table 22:  Regressions of Performance Pay of New CEOs Difference between DC and 
MNC After Turnover with Foreign Income as Foreign Variable – Significant 
Model at the .05 Significant Level 
 
 PERFPAY after - 
Domestic 
PERFPAY after- 
MNC 
 
PERFPAY – after 
Combined 
CEOAGE -.001 
(.737) 
-.005 
(.410) 
-.010 
(.018)** 
CEOED 
- .108 
(.180) 
.085 
(.179) 
CEOCHRM .162 
(.003)** 
.176 
(.163) 
.042 
(.545) 
Insider/Outsider 
-.083 
(.012)** 
.654 
(.002)** 
.060 
(.308) 
MGTOWN - .151 
(.047)* 
-.0000655 
(.151) 
FORINC - .000 
(.018)** 
- 
SIZE - -.00000002 
(.082)* 
.00000414 
(.315) 
STKRTN  .034 
(.162) 
-.0000353 
(.002)** 
.083 
(.121) 
STKRTN t-1 .180 
(.006)** 
-.189 
(.013)** 
-.181 
(.008)** 
EPS - -.423 
(.013)** 
- 
MULTISEG -.013 
(.077)* 
-.015 
(.217) 
- 
LEVRAT 
.032 
(.018)** 
.097 
(.054)* 
- 
BODSZ 
-.018 
(.066)* 
-.105 
(.097)* 
- 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 12 25 37 
F 110.79 3.634 2.242 
P-value .009** .022** .05** 
R2 .998 .845 .428 
Adj R2 .989 .612 .237 
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Table 23:  Regressions of Performance Pay of New CEOs Difference between DC and 
MNC After Turnover with Foreign Revenue as Foreign Variable  
 
 
 PERFPAY after 
Domestic 
PERFPAY after 
MNC 
 
PERFPAY – before 
Combined 
CEOAGE -.001 
(.737) 
-.003 
(.680) 
-.009 
(.142) 
CEOED 
- .056 
(.519) 
.090 
(.289) 
CEOCHRM .162 
(.003)** 
.023 
(.874) 
.032 
(.697) 
INSIDER 
/OUTSIDER 
-.083 
(.012)** 
.157 
(.062)* 
.076 
(.288) 
MGTOWN - .000 
(.031)** 
-.0000645 
(.269) 
FORREV - .124 
(.360) 
.050 
(.645) 
SIZE - .0000248 
(.011)** 
.00000739 
(.333) 
STKRTN  .034 
(.162) 
-.124 
(.106) 
-.087 
(.177) 
STKRTN t-1 .180 
(.006)** 
-.396 
(.002)** 
-.192 
(.049)** 
EPS - -.021 
(.130) 
-.006 
(.700) 
MULTISEG -.013 
(.077)* 
.049 
(.288) 
.033 
(.357) 
LEVRAT 
.032 
(.018)** 
-.070 
(.287) 
-.011 
(.821) 
BODSZ 
-.018 
(.066)* 
-.038 
(.033)** 
-.009 
(.578) 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 12 25 37 
F 110.79 2.749 1.089 
P-value .009** .056* .423 
R2 .998 .805 .466 
Adj R2 .989 .512 .038 
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Table 24. Regressions of Performance Pay of New CEOs Difference between DC and 
MNC After Turnover with Foreign Revenue as Foreign Variable – Significant 
Model at the .05 Significance Level 
 
 
 Performance 
Pay After - 
Domestic 
Performance 
Pay After - 
MNC 
Performance Pay 
After - Combined 
CEOAGE 
 
-.001 
(.737) 
-.002 
(.689) 
-.009 
(.049)** 
CEOED 
- .048 
(.481) 
.066 
(.272) 
CEOCHRM 
 
.162 
(.003)** 
- - 
Insider/Outsider 
-.083 
(.012)** 
.160 
(.044)** 
.070 
(.225) 
MGTOWN 
 
- .000 
(.022)** 
-.0000759 
(.116) 
FORREV 
 
- .134 
(.237) 
- 
SIZE 
 
- -.0000245 
(.006)** 
-.00000341 
(.414) 
STKRTN  
 
.034 
(.162) 
-.116 
(.032)** 
-.070 
(.136) 
STKRTN t-1 
 
.180 
(.006)** 
-.395 
(.001)*** 
-.163 
(.022)** 
EPS  
 
- -.022 
(.098)* 
- 
MULTISEG 
 
-.013 
(.077)* 
.047 
(.268) 
- 
LEVRAT 
.032 
(.018)** 
-.071 
(.247) 
- 
BODSZ 
-.018 
(.066)* 
-.038 
(.025)** 
- 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
#obs 12 25  
F 110.79 3.229 2.265 
P-value .009** .029** .049** 
R2 .998 .804 .430 
Adj R2 .989 .555 .240 
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Table 25. Logistic Regressions of CEO Turnover between DC and MNC with Foreign 
Income as Foreign Variable. 
 TURNOVER 
(DOM) 
TURNOVER 
(MNC) 
TURNOVER 
(ALL) 
CEOAGE .119 
(.301) 
.078 
(.104) 
.084 
(.029)** 
CEOTEN .038 
(.760) 
-.065 
(.571) 
-.009 
(.880) 
BS/BA 
.562 
(.731) 
3.742 
(.425) 
3.313 
(.524) 
MASTERS 
4.481 
(.044)** 
4.171 
(.386) 
4.491 
(.391) 
DOCTORAL 
- 4.737 
(.311) 
3.527 
(.502) 
CEOCHRM -2.291 
(.122) 
.127 
(.891) 
-.527 
(.420) 
CEOFOUNDER 
-.185 
(.932) 
.667 
(.748) 
.408 
(.665) 
MGTOWN .000 
(.672) 
.000 
(.853) 
.000 
(.593) 
FORINC .000 
(.885) 
.000 
(.426) 
.000 
(.190) 
FORSEG - - .422 
(.025)** 
SIZE 000 
(.636) 
- - 
STKRTN 
-.500 
(.580) 
-.478 
(.530) 
-.066 
(.876) 
STKRTN t-1 -4.782 
(.127) 
-.098 
(.855) 
-.122 
(.756) 
EPS -.094 
(.456) 
.194 
(.163) 
.012 
(.855) 
MULTISEG -.370 
(.371) 
-.340 
(.494) 
-.247 
(.304) 
LEVRAT 
-.608 
(.284) 
.204 
(.771) 
-.187 
(.331) 
BODSZ 
.480 
(.216) 
.078 
(.426) 
.125 
(.318) 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
F #obs 45 49 94 
Log likelihood stat 29.981 52.665 96.953 
P-value .028** .668 .019** 
R2 .455 .265 .272 
Overall Percentage 86.7 66.7 68.1 
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Table 26. Logistic Regressions of CEO Turnover between DC and MNC with all 
variables included with Foreign Revenue as Foreign Variable. 
 TURNOVER 
(DOM) 
TURNOVER 
(MNC) 
TURNOVER 
(ALL) 
CEOAGE .119 
(.301) 
.042 
(.445) 
.079 
(.035)** 
CEOTEN .038 
(.760) 
-.037 
(.719) 
-.002 
(.975) 
BS/BA 
.562 
(.731) 
1.604 
(.706) 
1.818 
(.598) 
MASTERS 
4.481 
(.044)** 
1.264 
(.774) 
2.746 
(.431) 
DOCTORAL 
- 2.050 
(.631) 
1.755 
(.618) 
CEOCHRM -2.291 
(.122) 
-.449 
(.625) 
-.666 
(.294) 
CEOFOUNDER 
-.185 
(.932) 
-.842 
(.618) 
-.060 
(.946) 
MGTOWN .000 
(.672) 
.000 
(.734) 
.000 
(.593) 
FORSEG - - .134 
(.407) 
FORREV 86.851 
(1.0) 
1.442 
(.629) 
.476 
(.750) 
SIZE - - - 
STKRTN 
-.500 
(.580) 
-.386 
(.581) 
.100 
(.801) 
STKRTN t-1 -4.782 
(.127) 
.213 
(.424) 
.224 
(.333) 
EPS -.094 
(.456) 
.129 
(.262) 
-.012 
(.844) 
MULTISEG -.370 
(.371) 
-.549 
(.274) 
-.247 
(.282) 
LEVRAT 
-.608 
(.284) 
.660 
(.331) 
-.161 
(.353) 
BODSZ 
.480 
(.216) 
.063 
(.687) 
.122 
(.302) 
    * Significant at the .1 level 
  ** Significant at the .05 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
f#obs 45 49 94 
Log likelihood stat 29.980 58.842 107.55 
P-value .028** .883 .065* 
R2 .465 .166 .186 
Overall Percentage 66.7 57.8 59.6 
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CHAPTER V 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Albert Einstein once said, “If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be 
called research, would it?”  Research always leads the researcher and those who read 
their work to some new insight and knowledge gained, or at least, that is the purpose of 
research in general.  And while this research yielded unexpected results, it has lead to 
know knowledge and even more questions that need to be addressed in future research. 
The research in this paper was focused on two major questions: 1) Do incumbent 
and new CEOs of multinational and domestic firms receive different compensation 
levels? And 2) Is the rate of turnover of these two groups different? For the most part, it 
can be said from the examination done in this research paper, that no significant 
differences were seen between the two groups, however the turnover rates, as a 
percentage, among each group were extremely different.  Multinational firms turnover 
nearly twice as often as domestic firms.  This discrepancy must be studied further. 
 
Conclusions 
 The theoretical basis for this research was based on three primary turnover 
theories as proposed by previous research.  The first theory addressed the skill levels or 
abilities of the CEOs and is the Scarcity or Ability Matching Theory. The second theory 
was based on agency theory or often called the entrenchment theory.  And the third and 
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final theory is based on the concept of the CEO as a scapegoat for the financial failure of 
the firm.   How each of these theories is supported or rejected by the data mixed 
discussion.  Hypothesis 1 tested whether the compensation of multinational firms was 
different that those of domestic firms.  The results showed that for incumbent CEOs there 
was no difference when examining TDC2. TDC2 showed a similar difference in the 
means on the surface with domestic firms earning nearly 2,000,000 more annually than 
multinational CEOs.  Domestic firms were at the mean level of 5431.98 (000s) and 
multinational firms were at the 3619. 05 (000s) level. With no significant difference 
between the two when the means tests were run, the support is for the Scapegoat Theory 
proposed by Huson in 2004.  The Capability and Entrenchment theories both contend that 
pay level of CEOs of MNEs should be higher.  They believe this for different reasons.  
The Capability theory predicts the higher pay because the job is more complex and on the 
other side. Entrenchment believes it is due to the manager entrenching him/herself. 
Scapegoat predicts both salaries to be equal.  Since multinational CEOs received lower 
salaries than domestic, it leads one to believe there is another reason for the higher pay in 
domestic firms.  Further study is needed to understand why domestic firms compensation 
measures are greater, but not significantly different, from multinational firms.  PERFPAY 
was calculated by the following: 
1) Perquisites and other personal benefits 
2) Above market earnings on restricted stock, options/SARs or deferred  
compensation paid during the year but deferred by the officer 
3) Earnings on long-term incentive plan compensation paid during the year but 
deferred at the election of the officer 
4) Tax Reimbursements 
5) The dollar value of differences between the price paid by the officer 
for company stock and the actual value of the stock under a stock purchase plan 
that is not generally available to shareholders or employees of the company. 
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The study results here suggest support for the scapegoat theory which says perks 
between the two groups should be equal because management capabilities are generic and 
no entrenchment exists.  There is no need to offer incentives for either group because all 
CEOs are equal.  Therefore H2 found no support for differences between the two groups, 
it therefore lending support to the Scapegoat theory.   
Hypothesis 3 focused on the turnover between the two groups and the percentages 
tell an interesting story.  Overall turnover rate was very similar to historical studies done 
on financial distress with a 39.36 percent (Gilson, 1990).  Domestic firms turned over at 
the rate of 26.6% with multinational firms turning over at nearly double this rate at 51.02 
percent.  This large discrepancy bears more analysis and will be discussed further in the 
next section. 
Hypothesis 4 and 5 paralleled hypotheses1 and 2 but examined the new CEOs 
who replaced the CEOs in power after the financial distress period.  The CEOs replaced 
following the distress showed interesting but completely insignificant results.  None of 
the means tests on new CEOs showed any level of significance.  Therefore, for all intents 
and purposes, the new CEOs of domestic firms were compensated similarly to those of 
multinational CEOs.  The null hypothesis of different levels of compensation and 
performance pay could not be accepted. TDC2 and PERFPAY for succeeding CEOs 
cannot be said to be unequal. The question then becomes why the gap between the two 
became so great in later time periods. There is no significant difference between the two 
groups. TDC2 for domestic CEOs was 3387.93 and for multinational firms was 2807. 95.  
Once again multinational CEOs are compensated at a lower rate than the domestic CEOs, 
although performance pay, as a percentage, was greater for CEOs of multinational firms.  
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This leads one to assume that multinational firms place more importance on long-term 
incentives than do the domestic firms. 
With these varying results, the next step is an examination of what variables 
impacted compensation the most.  The regression lends some insight to this question. 
 
Discussion 
 The linear multiple regressions gave insight to what impacted each group the 
most. The first set of regressions was executed on three groups: domestic firms, 
multinational firms and then all firms combined.  Each regression was run with one of the 
foreign variables: Foreign Income (dollars) and Foreign Revenue (percentage of foreign 
revenue to total revenue).  While the entire model was highly significant at the .001 level, 
the only significant variables were managerial ownership, size of the firm and board size. 
Board of directors, size and makeup, have been shown in previous literature to impact 
compensation levels (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998).  This research supports previous work 
that BODSZ impacts all levels of compensation.  Previous research has also linked size 
and compensation.  The surprising conclusion that showed through each one of these 
regressions was that the level of foreign income seemed to have no significant impact on 
any firm, but especially the multinational firms.  How this factor impacts the CEOs bears 
further research. 
 Performance Pay variables were also examined for both foreign variables showing 
no significant results at all. While disappointing, this is not surprising since most 
performance pay is tied to stock grants and options. And a review of the firms showed 
very little option payouts during the distressed period unless the CEO was leaving the 
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firm and severance packages were distributed.  Even at this point, stocks were lower so 
payout was less.    
 The final regressions were executed on the succeeding CEOs. The education 
variable was changed for this group due to limited degrees of the new CEOs.  All of these 
CEOs held Masters degrees thus making this variable difficult to examine. Therefore the 
CEOED was created where a BA/BS was equal to 0, and an advanced degree was 
represented by 1.  The Compensation of CEOs of domestic firms was not impacted by 
any of the examined variables.  When examined under both foreign variables, 
multinational CEOs compensation was impacted by the previous stock return, 
insider/outsider status, leverage ratio and board of director’s size. Not surprisingly, 
foreign income was only an impacting variable for the multinational firms but was not 
significant at any level of alpha. The only significant variable for both groups combined 
was the size, previous stock return, leverage ratio and board size.  No link was found to 
the earnings per share in any of the groups which was surprising since much of agency 
theory literature suggests that compensation is tied to the earnings per share. The lack of 
results linking compensation to earnings per share lends support to the idea that firms in 
distress do not perform as firms in good financial shape. 
 TDC2 and PERFPAY were even less impressive, even when the regression was 
allowed to run until a significant model was determined.  The model was significant at 
the .037 and .046 levels for domestic and multinational firms.  The models of both groups 
were impacted by different variables.  The CEOs age, education, number of segments, 
current stock return, and board size were significant to domestic firms.  Insider/Outsider 
status, firm size, previous stock return and board size were significant on the 
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multinational firms’ regression.  And the only variable that was significant for all 
companies combined was the size of the board.    
 Finally, the logistical regression was the most valuable regression for the addition 
of new knowledge to scholarly review.  The logistical regression gave insight into which 
firm and CEO variables had the greatest impact on turnover.  For both the domestic 
regression and the combined groups, a significant model was present. In the domestic 
firms, while the overall model was highly significant at the .028 the only variable that 
was significant was the education level but this is suspect because all the domestic CEOs 
had only a masters level of education. When the two groups of firms were combined, the 
only two significant variables were the number of foreign segments and the age of the 
CEO.  One surprising fact seen in the turnovers was that Chairman of the Board had no 
impact.  Historically, entrenchment research would suggest that this would reduce the 
incidence of turnover. And when examining the data, 27 of the 37, or approximately 70% 
of CEO turnovers, held the position of both CEO and Chairman of the board.   Of these, 
nearly 63% were CEOs of multinational corporations. It seems that those who held both 
positions were removed more readily than those that did not.  
   Some of the most interesting results came from the means tests of all independent 
variables.  These results give additional insight into the differences between domestic and 
multinational firms.  It was not surprising that all the international variables were 
significantly different, but other independent variables were surprising.   First, the general 
age of the CEO was older for domestic firms than multinational firms (57, 54) with a 
significance level of .036. But what is most surprising was, that while the domestic firms 
CEOs are older, there was a lower rate of turnover.  This lends credence to the idea that 
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CEO entrenchment is easier in domestic firms than in multinational firms.  Secondly, the 
managerial ownership levels were nearly triple for domestic firms than multinational. 
With domestic ownership levels at the mean of 1665 and multinational levels at 560, and 
a significance level of .054, this discrepancy needs further research. The higher the level 
of managerial ownership seems to produce a much lower probability of turnover.  This 
once again seems in line with the agency theory.  The CEOs with more power through 
ownership of shares, should be less likely to be dismissed, however was not validated in 
this data set.  A third interesting result from the means tests was the significant difference 
in both stock returns and earnings per share.  Domestic firms current stock returns were 
much lower (.0281) and their earnings per share decreased at a much greater level (-
4.55).  On the other hand, multinational firms had higher stock returns (.2054) and 
smaller earnings per share losses (-.968).  A fourth and final difference was seen in the 
leverage ratios.  Leverage ratio was quadruple for domestic firms than multinational 
firms.  So overall, the domestic firms performed more poorly, their CEOs were older and 
owned a larger share of the firm’s stock and their firms were more leveraged.  And yet, 
they had half the turnover rates of multinational firms. 
   
Contributions to Literature 
 Overall, there is much more research to be done before one can accurately predict 
why senior level managers are dismissed but this paper has given more support to the 
scapegoat theory on three levels.   
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1) Multinational firms and domestic firms do receive, essentially, the same pay 
level, but multinational firms seem to pay less to incumbent CEOs than 
domestic firms do.  
2) The percentage of multinational CEOs that are dismissed is significantly 
larger than those of domestic firms, at nearly double the rate. 
3) Succeeding CEOs salaries are smaller than their preceding CEOs, lending 
support to the Scapegoat theory. But several factors cannot be explained from 
the results of this data and will require more research. 
4) Performance pay was not seen to have any significant difference between any  
of the incumbent or replacement groups in either multinational or domestic 
firms, lending support to the Scapegoat theory. 
5) Finally, and most important for future research is the differences between the  
independent variables between multinational and domestic firm, that are most 
often tied to entrenchment within the domestic firms. 
 
Limitations 
 The most significant limitation of this research is the final sample size.  The most 
important single change must be an increase in the sample size to at least 100 of both 
multinational and domestic turnovers.  The increase should be accomplished by 
increasing the number of years of distressed firms examined to gain more initially 
distressed firms, thus providing more turnovers to examine.  A larger sample of domestic 
firms will also yield more knowledge on turnover among domestic firms.  Due to time 
	  	  
103	  
limitations, the number of employees was used a size variable but in future research 
Market Capitalization, ROA or Sales might prove a better size indicator. 
A more detailed breakdown of compensation should also be examined isolating 
strictly the performance variables.  Data on foreign assets was not available in the time 
frame given, so the research should include a foreign asset variable. 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
 
 There are several key areas for further research that should be followed.  First, a 
focus on the differences between incumbent and succeeding CEOs, with focus on the 
levels of differences among all types of compensation, including options, is needed for 
these two groups. Although examining option grants is difficult in distressed firms, due to 
the limited payouts during distressed periods. 
Second, an inclusion of variables that impact multinational firms more than 
domestic firms might yield insight into the higher turnover in multinational firms. For 
example a measure of international sales trends globally. Or the addition of a cultural 
variable to measure differences among various countries and cultures would be valuable, 
especially the segment from which the greatest percentage of revenues is derived.  
A third and very important area is a stronger data set on the impact of board of 
directors.  It has been long stated that board of directors, and their monitoring 
mechanisms, are extremely important for multinational firms (Huson et al, 2001). And 
the board of directors in this research was often the only significant variable seen in both 
groups. A further study of the mechanisms involved in turnover of multinational firms 
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would be valuable. A stronger measure should also include the composition of the board 
including at a minimum insider/outsider information but also should include number of 
international members.  
A fourth area that would be an extension of this research would be to add a 
variable for years of international experience.  Much research in recent years has focused 
on the value that international management experience has on the firm.   
A fifth area of future research is a better examination of how distressed firms are 
fundamentally different than financially healthy firms.  Very few of the historic theories 
apply easily to financially distressed firms. Financially distressed firms seldom behave as 
do healthy firms. Early research indicated that compensation in multinational firms was 
hard to measure due to many differences, and further research into these cultural and 
behavioral differences might add understanding to this complex topic (Harvey, 1993). 
Finally an examination of entrenchment levels between the two groups is the most 
immediate and necessary follow up of this research.  The very obvious differences 
between age, managerial ownership, stock return, earnings per share and leverage ratio 
between the two groups is an immediate and necessary study.    
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